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SEAN PAGER
Strictness vs. Discretion: The European Court of
Justice's Variable Vision of Gender Equality
Although the principle of equality dates back to Aristotle, its in-
carnation as a fundamental right of the European Community (EC)
has been a story of uneven progress. Just as Aristotle's Greece had
slavery, EC equality law has been selective as to its domains and
manner of application, constructed-like the Community itself-in
stages, in a sometimes untidy process. For most of the EC's exis-
tence, equality of gender occupied a solitary and somewhat anoma-
lous position as one of the few justiciable social rights in Community
law.1 In contrast to the pivotal role played by the rights of free move-
ment in ensuring equality of nationality throughout the common
market, 2 gender equality entered the EC Treaty almost by accident3
and in a far more marginal capacity: Article 119 of the Treaty of
Rome guaranteed only equality of pay between men and women for
identical work.
As the Community expanded into new competences, gender
equality has grown steadily in scope and prominence. Subsequent
directives expanded on equality of pay to require equal treatment
generally in employment and social security.4 Recent initiatives
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1. See Miguel Poiares Maduro, "Europe's Social Self: 'The Sickness Unto Death',"
in Jo Shaw, (ed.), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union 333 (2000)
(describing gender equality as "a lone ranger").
2. See Sacha Prechal & Noreen Burrows, Gender Discrimination of the European
Community 1 (1990) ("the main thrust of the [original E.C.] Treaty [lay] in the elimi-
nation of discrimination based on nationality"). The rights of free movement decree
that workers, goods, services, and capital should be able to circulate without respect
to nationality. These rights appeared in a Treaty chapter entitled "Foundations of
Community." See Treaty of Rome (1957), Part II.
3. See infra n. 46 and accompanying text.
4. Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976, on Equal Treatment for
Men and Women in Employment, OJ [19761 L 39/40 [hereinafter Equal Treatment
Directive or ETD]; Council Directive of 19 December, 1978 on the Progressive Imple-
mentation of Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Social Security, Directive 79/7/
EEC, 1978 O.J. L 113/114.
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have been even grander. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty made the task
of securing equality between men and women a primary aim of the
European Community, putting equality of gender for the first time on
a par with that of nationality.5 A separate article of the revised EC
Treaty calls for gender equality to be promoted in every activity the
Community undertakes. 6
Yet, even today, gender equality remains far from the uniform,
all-pervasive norm that Amsterdam's aspirations would imply. Its
formal domain is still limited to employment and social security, and
even here its application is variable and falls short of the strict en-
forcement given to the rights of free movement. Viewed up close, the
topology of EC gender equality law reveals both peaks and valleys,
ambiguities and apparent contradictions. This article surveys that
terrain from a characteristically "American" perspective: focusing on
the method and intensity of judicial scrutiny by the European Court
of Justice (ECJ).7
European scholarship on gender equality has focused on the per-
ceived alternation by the Court between a "formal" and "substantive"
conception of equality.8 This is not an unrelated question, since as
will be shown, the intensity of equality scrutiny can be linked to the
type of equality being pursued.9 A scrutiny-based approach, how-
ever, highlights important features of the case law that the substan-
tive/formal dichotomy fails to capture. Commentators have often
puzzled over seeming inconsistencies in the test(s) which the Court of
Justice applies to gender cases.10 This article suggests that there is a
method to the ECJ's apparent madness. By analyzing variations in
5. See EC Treaty, Art. 2. The text of EC Treaties, including the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, may be obtained at europa.eu.int.
6. Id. at Art. 3(2).
7. The European Court of Justice is the principal court of the European Commu-
nity and the authoritative interpreter of EC law. All cites to the European Commu-
nity Reporter (ECR) are to this court.
8. Shaw, "Gender and the European Court of Justice," in G. de Bdirca & J. Wei-
ler, (eds.), The European Court of Justice 155 (2001); Peters, "The Many Meanings of
Equality and Positive Action in Favour of Women under European Community Law-
A Conceptual Analysis," 2 Eur. L.J. 177 (1996); Fenwick & Hervey, "Sex Equality in
the Single Market: New Directions for the European Court of Justice," 32 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rev. 443 (1995).
9. See infra text between nn. 51 and 52.
10. See, e.g., Barnard & Hepple, "Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-
Smith," 58 Cambr. L.J. 399, 411 (1999) ("There seem now to be at least three tests for
objective justification .... No explanation has been offered for these different tests.");
Steiner, "The Principle of Equal Treatment for Men and Women in Social Security," in
Tamara Hervey & David O'Keefe, (eds.), Sex Equality in the European Union 135
(1996) ("recent case law shows the Court blowing hot and cold"); Ellis, "The Recent
Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the Field of Sex Equality," 37 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rev. 1403, 1410 (2000) ("National courts seem, therefore, to be faced with a hierarchy
of tests"); Fenwick, "Special Protections for Women in European Union Law," in Her-
vey & O'Keefe, cited in this note, 70 (contrasting lax scrutiny of pregnancy cases with
strict indirect pay discrimination cases).
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the approach by which the Court has vetted justifications for discrim-
ination against women (or sometimes men), the article reveals pat-
terns in the type of review applied. Such variable scrutiny, it is
argued, represents a complex practice by which the ECJ reconciles
Member State autonomy in social policy with the demands of equality
as a fundamental right.11 As will be seen, this conflict typically plays
out in the case law as a tug-of-war between liberal individualism at
the EU level and traditional gender roles at the national. The bal-
ance struck between these countervailing forces varies according to
the nature of the justification.
Part I provides an overview of the ECJ's methodology in equality
cases. Part II traces the historical background leading to the emer-
gence of gender equality as a fundamental right. Part III examines
justifications for direct discrimination under the Equal Treatment
Directive and contrasts the differing focus of the Court's review
under each of the three grounds for derogation. Part IV performs a
similar analysis of indirect discrimination cases, revealing the
stricter approach in private contexts than public. Part V then steps
backward to take a broader view of some central themes that emerge
from the analysis, and Part VI concludes.
I. METHODOLOGY OF EQUALITY REVIEW
The ECJ formulation of the equality right comes straight out of
Aristotle: It holds that likes should be treated alike, and unlikes dif-
ferently. 12 The EC Treaty lacks a general equality norm comparable
to the US Equal Protection Clause. 13 Instead, different articles of the
Treaty govern particular types of equality in defined contexts, sup-
plemented by even more specific secondary legislation. These provi-
sions, in effect, specify the "likes" that must be treated alike (men
and women, EU nationals) unless a deviation from equality (discrimi-
nation) can be objectively justified. 14
In exercising judicial review over such justifications, the Court,
in theory, applies the same test in all cases. Departures from equal-
ity must be based on a legitimate purpose and the chosen means
must be proportionate to this end. In cases of direct (facial) discrimi-
11. Whether this practice represents a deliberate strategy is a difficult question
as to which this article will remain agnostic.
12. Compare Herdegen, "The Relation Between the Principles of Equality and
Proportionality," 22 Comm. Mkt. L. Rev. 683, 684-85 (1985) (quoting variant formula-
tions of the equality principle in EC case law), with Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachean,
vol. 3: 1131a-1131b (W. Ross trans. 1925).
13. While the ECJ has recognized equality as a basic principle of EC law, the
principle is only actionable in domains in which the Community has exercised compe-
tence. See Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgian State, 1971 ECR 445.
14. Herdegen, supra n. 12, at 684-85. Objective justification amounts to a deter-
mination that the two likes are unalike for the relevant purpose. See generally Wes-
ten, "The Empty Idea of Equality," 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 564-69 (1982).
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nation, the grounds for derogation are typically specified in the rele-
vant equality norm.15 The grounds on which indirect discrimination
(disparate impact) may be justified are left open. In either case, as-
suming the purpose is prima facie legitimate, the justification must
be tested for proportionality. Proportionality requires that the mea-
sure be both (1) suitable and (2) necessary to meet the stated end,
and that (3) the burdens it imposes be proportionate to the benefits. 16
In cases referred to it through Article 234 (ex 177) preliminary refer-
ences, the Court sometimes defers to the national court to assess
proportionality. 17
Depending on the case, the Court of Justice may subject the jus-
tification under review to a greater or lesser degree of scrutiny. The
ECJ does not adhere to the rigid tiers of scrutiny that characterize
US equal protection' 8 ; nor has it articulated the principles that gov-
ern its choices as to the level of scrutiny applied in its cases in the
self-conscious manner of the US Supreme Court.19 However, certain
patterns may be discerned. The Court often chooses a deferential ap-
proach to aspects of national law as to which it considers that Mem-
ber States have the primary competence. In such cases, policy claims
will often be accepted at face value, and instead of requiring a show-
ing of necessity in its proportionality analysis, the Court may merely
15. See, e.g., Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case
222/84, 1986 ECR 1651 (limiting justifications for gender discrimination to grounds
specified in the governing directive).
16. As in US equal protection, proportionality thus looks at both ends and means,
and establishes an appropriate relation between them. See Jans, "Proportionality Re-
visited," 27 J. Legal Issues of Econ. Int. 239, 243-48 (2000); cf. Tussman & Tenbroek,
"The Equal Protection of the Laws", 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, 343-53 (1949).
17. Under Article 234, the European Court's jurisdiction is limited to answering
questions of European law in abstracto; it remains for the national court to apply this
law to the facts of the case-including the proportionality assessment. In practice,
the ECJ often tailors its answer according to the facts presented, and, in doing so,
may engage in its own analysis of proportionality. Where the facts are technically
complex or politically sensitive, the European Court is more likely to defer to the na-
tional court. See Jacobs, "Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in
European Community Law," in Evelyn Ellis, (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in
the Laws of Europe 19-20 (1999).
18. Cf., e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-30 (1995) (all
racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(intermediate scrutiny for gender). By contrast, the intensity of the ECJ's propor-
tionality inquiry seems to vary according to the interests at stake in the individual
case and the relative competence of the decision-making bodies involved. See Grainn6
de Bdrca, "The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law," 13 Yearbk.
of Eur. L. 105, 111-13, 146-49 (1993); Jans, supra n. 16, at 263-64.
19. Cf. Adarand, at 214-220; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-199; United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The case law on heightened scrutiny
has spawned a huge secondary literature. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust (1980); Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," 5 J. Phil. & Publ.
Aff 107 (1976).
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verify only that the challenged measure is "not manifestly
unreasonable. 20
At the other end of the spectrum, free movement cases generally
receive the most rigorous scrutiny and demand the most weighty jus-
tification. Just as racial equality provided the original goal of the US
Equal Protection Clause and race became the paradigmatic "suspect
classification," 2 1 the free movement rights enjoy a similar founda-
tional status under Community law. 22 The ECJ has held repeatedly
that "derogati[ons] from the fundamental principle of freedom of
movement ... must be interpreted strictly."2 3 Even where the ECJ
has been willing to grant a measure of discretion to Member States,
for example, in determining grounds for derogation based on public
morality or health, it has emphasized that the parameters of such
choices "cannot be determined unilaterally" remain subject to strict
proportionality controls. 24
What exactly "strict" means is unclear; there is no doctrinal
equivalent of US strict scrutiny. Strictness can manifest at more
than one stage of review and assume several forms. For example, a
strict approach at the level of purpose might sanction only purposes
deemed important: e.g. limiting a public policy derogation to a "genu-
ine and sufficiently serious threat ... affecting one of the fundamen-
tal interests of society."25 Alternatively, the Court might restrict
purpose through a narrow or literal interpretation of the governing
text: e.g., construing "national security" to include military threats,
but not environmental.
Strictness also permeates the various levels of the proportional-
ity test. Under-inclusive measures might be deemed unsuitable.
Over-inclusiveness fails the test of necessity since "less restrictive op-
20. Cases 1 & 176/90, Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior SA v. Dep'to de Sanidad y
Seguridad Social de la Gen'litat de Cataluna, 1991 ECR 4151; See de B1irca, supra n.
18, at 112.
21. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81-82 (1872) (noting
racial goal of Fourteenth Amendment); MacKinnon, "Reflections on Sex Equality,"
100 Yale L. J. 1281, 89 (1991) ("The African-American struggle for social equality has
been the crucible for [U.S.] equality law"); Tussman & tenBroek, supra n. 16, at 356-
60.
22. See Koopmans, "Equal Protection-The Social Dimension of European Com-
munity Law," 11 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 4 (1989) (arguing that nationality under EU law
has become akin to a "suspect classification" under US equal protection doctrine);
Lenaerts, "L'Egalite de Traitement en Droit Comm.: Un Principle Unique aux Ap-
parences Multiple," 1991 Cahiers de Droit Europ. 3, 12-13 (1991); Maduro, supra n. 1,
at 332 ("fundamental freedoms [of free movement] grant[ed] status similar to that of
fundamental rights"); Prechal & Burrows, supra n. 2, at 1.
23. Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 ECR 1219, 1231; Case 30/
77, Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 ECR 1999, 2013. But see Cases 90 & 176/90,
Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior S.A. v. Dept. de Sanidad & Seguridad, 1991 ECR
4151, 4184, 17 (applying weaker "not manifestly unreasonable" standard).
24. E.g., Rutilli, 1975 ECR at 1231, $ 27; Regina, 1977 ECR at 2013, 33.
25. Regina, 1977 ECR at 2014; Rutili, 1975 ECR at 1231.
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tions" would exist to achieve the desired end.26 Moreover, in seeking
to reconcile the derogating measure as far as possible with equality,
the Court will sometimes impose affirmative conditions, e.g. requir-
ing flexibility or reciprocity to minimize burdensome effects. 27
Strictness also colors the evidentiary requirements to meet these
tests. A strict-minded Court is marked by skepticism; the Court will
independently assess the evidence to reach its own conclusions. 28 It
also requires evidence to conform to general standards of specificity,
transparency, and consistency: Justifications must be backed by con-
crete evidence within an identified context (specificity) 29 ; the evi-
dence must be presented in a form amenable to judicial review
(transparency)30 ; and stated polices must be uniformly applied with-
out exception (consistency).31
The stricter the scrutiny, the greater the likelihood of judicial in-
tervention. Strict review of free movement cases has thus meant that
comparatively few import restrictions survive. Such strict enforce-
ment of equality in the name of market integration has the potential
to be profoundly subversive of cultural norms endemic to individual
Member States. A good example of this is Commission v. Germany,
where the ECJ rejected German regulations that restricted use of the
designation "Bier," to beers conforming to traditional German stan-
dards. Brushing aside the German government's claimed need to
protect consumer expectations, the Court ruled that "legislation of a
Member State must not 'crystallize' consumer habits to consolidate
an advantage acquired by national industries."3 2 German tastes had
26. E.g., Case 368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und Vertriebs
GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, 1997 ECR 3689, 3717; Case 40/82, Community v.
United Kingdom, 1982 ECR 2793, 2826-27.
27. E.g., Case 272/80, Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische
Producten BV, 1981 ECR 3277, 3291-92 (requiring reciprocal recognition of regula-
tory approval by other Member States to avoid unnecessary retesting); Case 178/84,
Commission v. Germany, 1987 ECR 1227, 1274 (requiring provision for challenges to
discriminatory rules).
28. See, e.g., Case 124181, Commission v. United Kingdom, 83 ECR 203, 238-39
(rejecting arguments by UK based on review of technical documents); Case 153/78,
Commission v. Germany, 1979 ECR 2555, 2565-67 (same for Germany).
29. Vague generalizations will not stand. See, e.g., Case 3/88, Commission v. It-
aly, 1989 ECR 4035, 4060-4061.
30. In other words, the Court must be able to draw meaningful answers from the
evidence submitted. See, e.g., Case 470/99, Universale-Bau AG v. Entsorgungsbe-
triebe Simmering GmnH, judgment, December 12, 2002, T 91.
31. See, e.g., Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd. v. Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, 1986
ECR 1007, 1023-24 (UK not permitted to enforce decency standard against imported
goods without equivalent restriction on domestic goods).
32. The Court further observed that compulsory product labels would afford a less
restrictive alternative (lack of necessity), Commission v. Germany, 1987 ECR at 1271,
35, and that the German legislature itself used the term "Bier" in a broad sense
elsewhere in its own regulations (lack of consistency). Id. at 33.
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to remain free to evolve through exposure to the common market.33
The communal standard gave way to individual choice.
Where does the scrutiny applied to gender cases fall in this spec-
trum from lax to strict? The answer lies somewhere in between, akin
to the "intermediate scrutiny" eventually settled on by US courts. 34
As with the US Supreme Court, the ECJ began with a fairly deferen-
tial approach to gender equality cases and has gradually ratcheted
upward the intensity of its review. However, this progression has
been anything but uniform. Indeed, one could equally say that the
European Court has applied two different standards, alternating be-
tween strict enforcement of proportionality and a more deferential
approach. These extremes can be illustrated by a comparison of two
cases interpreting Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive.
In Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse,35 an extended maternity
leave was alleged to discriminate against men. The Court had to de-
cide whether the benefits could be justified under Article 2(3), which
granted an exception to equal treatment for "the protection of women,
particularly as regards pregnancy." 36 The Court declined to subject
the benefits to a test of proportionality, holding that "Member States
enjoy a reasonable margin of discretion as regards both the nature of
the protective measures and the detailed arrangements for their
implementation. " 37
By contrast, in Johnston v. Constable,38 the Court held that Arti-
cle 2(3) "must be interpreted strictly" as a derogation from an individ-
ual right. Accordingly, the Court refused to allow the exclusion of
female police officers from duty in Northern Ireland to be justified "on
the ground that public opinion demands that women be given greater
protection." The Court also made clear that such derogations from
equal treatment must pass a strict proportionality test limiting them
to "what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view
and . . .be reconciled as far as possible with [equal treatment]." 3 9
Member State discretion was entirely absent from this analysis.
The apparent inconsistency between these two judgments, de-
cided only two years apart, points to a deep ambiguity concerning the
nature of gender equality in Community law. In manipulating the
opposing concepts of "strictness" and "discretion," the ECJ engages in
a complex dialectical practice that maintains a balance between the
33. Commission v. Germany, 1987 ECR 1227, 1270-71.
34. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing new intermediate
scrutiny standard for gender cases).
35. Case 184/83, 1984 ECR 3047, at TT 26-27.
36. Article 2(3) of Equal Treatment Directive.
37. Id. at T1 27.
38. Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
1986 ECR 1651 (1986).
39. Id. at 1 39-40. This language appeared with regard to a separate ground for
justification under Article 2(2).
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dictates of equality as a fundamental right and the autonomy that
Member States expect over social policy.
In cases since Johnston, the Court has consistently continued to
construe exceptions to equal treatment as derogations. 40 In its indi-
rect discrimination cases, the Court has also applied skeptical scru-
tiny and strict proportionality control that at times approaches strict
review.41 Yet, the Court has also continued to recognize that Mem-
ber States enjoy a margin of discretion in social policy. The Court
confirmed this discretion in an Article 2(3) case as recently as
Thibault in 1998.42 Moreover, deference to Member State social pol-
icy has continued to play a prominent role in indirect discrimination
cases.4 3 In other words, the Court of Justice seems to want to have it
both ways.
The problem that the Court faces is rooted in the historical ori-
gins of the gender equality right. Unlike free movement, gender
equality did not begin with the status of a fundamental right.44 Arti-
cle 119's equal pay requirement appeared in the E.C. Treaty's chap-
ter on social policy, an area which "Member States considered [to]
1[ie] at the very heart of national sovereignty."45 Moreover, Article
119's very existence owed more to narrow economic interest than
egalitarian concern. 46 Even today, for all the symbolism of the Am-
sterdam amendments, the E.C. Treaty still lacks any formal require-
ment of gender equality beyond equal pay. Instead, broader
provisions for gender equality have been added through directives
and soft law. Reliance on these flexible instruments signaled a
40. See, e.g., Case 450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 ECR 3051,
21 (Article 2(4) of ETD); Case 285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000
ECR 69, 20 (Article 2(2)); Secretary of State for Social Security v. Thomas, 1993
ECR 1247, 1272, 8 S (Article 7(1)(a) of the Social Security Directive).
41. Cf., e.g., Case 243/95, Hill and Stapleton v. Revenue Comm'r, 1998 ECR 3739,
3771-72.
42. Case 136/95, Caisse Nat'le d'Assur. Vieillesse des Traivaill. Salaries v.
Thibault, 1998 ECR 2011, % 30.
43. See, e.g., Case 167/97, R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Sey-
mour-Smith, 1999 ECR 650, at 75.
44. The original Article 119 was addressed solely to Member States, and was not
thought to create a right of individuals, nor any competence for Community action.
See Boch, "The European Community and Sex Equality: Why and How?," in Noreen
Burrows, Sex Equality: Law and Economics 9-11, 14 (1993).
45. Barnard, "EC 'Social' Policy," in Paul Craig & Grainn6 de Bdrca, Evolution of
EU Law 498 (1999), at 482; Burrows, "The Future of Sex Equality in the EC," in
Burrows, supra n. 44, at 56; Kenner, "Citizenship and Fundamental Rights: Re-
shaping the European Social Model," in his, ed., Trends in European Social Policy 18
(1995).
46. France, which required equal pay under French law, was concerned that it
would be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis other Member States who
paid women discriminatory wages. Barnard, supra n. 45, at 498.
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strong desire by the Member states to preserve some autonomy in
this domain. 47
In its early equal treatment cases, the Court obliged by deferring
to Member States discretion over social policy. 48 Yet, once the Court
had embarked on a jurisprudence of fundamental rights (itself not a
wholly voluntary project), it was inevitable that it would have to rec-
ognize gender as one of those rights.49 Having grasped that nettle,
putting gender equality on a par with free movement, a move to strict
review was the logical consequence. Instead of permitting Member
States a margin of discretion, the Court now had to interpose itself
between individual and state as the protector of a fundamental
right.50
It took some time for the logic of this new jurisprudential tack to
work itself through the case law. In Levy, the Court took an evolu-
tionary view of the process, commenting that "[w]hile it's true that
equal treatment of men and women constitutes a fundamental right
recognized the Community legal order, its implementation, even at
the Community level, has been gradual, requiring the Council to take
action by means of directives, and those directives allow, temporarily,
certain derogations from the principle of equal treatment."5 1 Over
time, the ECJ review of gender equality cases has gotten stricter.
However, the Court has been selective in choosing its battlefields and
matching its tactics to the terrain. By varying the intensity and focus
of scrutiny according to the specific equality provision at issue, the
Court of Justice has been able to combine a vigorous defense of funda-
mental rights with a sensitivity to Member State discretion over so-
cial policy.
II. DIRECT DISCRIMINATION
As already noted, the European Court of Justice's approach to
direct discrimination-laws that explicitly employ gender classifica-
tions-reveals a classic Aristotelian understanding of equality: Likes
47. Hervey, "Sex Equality in Social Protection: New Institutionalist Perspectives
on Allocation of Competence," 4 Eur. L.J. 196, 213 (1998) (use of directives to imple-
ment gender policy); Kenner, supra n. 45, at 10, 18, 40-44. This use of flexible instru-
ments which lack horizontal direct effect can be contrasted with the free movement
provisions, which have been implemented through directly effective Treaty articles
and regulations. Kenner, supra n. 45, at 18.
48. See infra text accompanying nn. 54-58, 91.
49. It was not until nearly a decade into its fundamental rights jurisprudence
that the ECJ took this leap with gender equality in Defrenne III, despite several prior
opportunities to do so. See Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navi-
gation, 1978 ECR 1365, 26-27.
50. The link between fundamental rights and strict review was apparent in Rob-
erts, the first gender case to apply such a strict interpretation, which justified its
strict approach "in view of the fundamental importance of the principle of equal treat-
ment." Case 151/84, Roberts v. Tate & Lyle Indus. Ltd., 1986 ECR 703, 721, 35.
51. Case 158/91, Criminal Proceedings re: Levy, 93 ECR 4287, 4305.
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must be treated alike, but where they differ, differential treatment is
justified (and perhaps, required). This begs two questions: What dif-
ferences count? And in whose eyes are they to be assessed? These
questions can be linked to the level of scrutiny.
The less deferential the judicial review, the more courts will be
tempted to intervene, replacing their judgment for that of policy-
makers. In cases involving direct discrimination, this has tended to
press towards a formal conception of equality in which few gender
differences are recognized as justifying a departure from gender-
blind norms. Applied to the Equal Treatment Directive, strict review
privileges Article 2(1)'s prohibition of gender discrimination over the
three exceptions contained in Articles 2(2)-2(4), with the latter being
construed as derogations from the former, to be narrowly construed
and tightly controlled. In the case of Articles 2(2) and 2(3), and to a
lesser extent Article 2(4), the result has been rulings that undermine
traditional gender roles, as communal standards imposed by Member
State governments are replaced with judicially-enforced autonomy.
Thus, under Johnston, women can choose to face risks from which the
public would exclude them.
Conversely, a less exacting method of scrutiny will tend to be tol-
erant of gender stereotypes, favoring exceptions from formal equal
treatment, which may be viewed as complements to the primary rule
that in fact perfect it. Thus, in Hofmann, one finds a conception of
Article 2(3) as "offset[ting] the disadvantages" faced by women leads
to a triumph for traditional motherhood.
Of course, neither link is absolute. A court applying strict review
can always be persuaded that derogations are factually justified.
Conversely, a more relaxed approach will not oblige Member States
to implement derogating measures, unless such deviations are actu-
ally mandated by equality.
A. Article 2(3)
Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive permits Member
States to exempt from equal treatment "provisions concerning the
protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and mater-
nity."52 In Hofmann, the Court further construed Article 2(3) as au-
thorizing gender-specific measures to protect "the special
relationship between a woman her child ... from being disturbed by
the multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pur-
suit of employment."53 It has taken a restrictive view of this excep-
tion outside the context of pregnancy/maternity.
52. ETD, Art. 2(3).
53. 84 ECR at 3075, T 25.
[Vol. 51
HeinOnline -- 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 562 2003
STRICTNESS VS. DISCRETION
In its early rulings on Article 2(3), the Court of Justice adopted a
deferential approach. As we saw, in Hofmann, the Court rejected a
claim that an extended maternity leave should be made available to
either parent. The Commission had pushed for a restrictive interpre-
tation of Article 2(3), as a derogation from the fundamental right of
equality. It argued that the goal of protecting mothers against multi-
ple burdens could be just as easily accomplished if the father took
care of the child.54
The Court did not engage these arguments, holding instead that
because "the protection of women in connection with pregnancy and
maternity .... [is] closely linked to the general system of social pro-
tection ... Member States enjoy a reasonable margin of discretion as
regards both the nature of the protective measures and the detailed
arrangements for their implementation." 55 Recognition of this dis-
cretion foreclosed further review.
The rationale of Commission v. Italy, decided two years earlier,
was even more abridged. In that case, the Commission, supported by
Advocate General Rozes, had argued that Italy's allowance of a three
month maternity leave to mothers, but not fathers of adopted chil-
dren was discriminatory. 56 As in Hofmann, the issue was whether
the measure could be justified under Article 2(3). The Court simply
accepted at face value the Italian government's view that the discrim-
ination was justified "by the legitimate concern to assimilate.., the
child into the adoptive family."57 Why only mothers, but not fathers
could facilitate this assimilation was not discussed.
In neither of these cases does the ECJ enter into an analysis of
proportionality. Its judicial review is confined to verifying that the
stated justification accords with a recognized exception to equal
treatment. Beyond that, the Court essentially leaves it to the discre-
tion of the individual Member State to determine the content and
scope of each exception. Indeed, in Hofmann, it made this deference
explicit by recognizing a margin of discretion in social policy.
The contrast with the German Bier case is striking. There, the
ECJ refused to allow Germany to protect consumer expectations
under a communal standard that discriminated against foreign im-
ports. Instead, consumer tastes had to be given the opportunity to
evolve through competition in a free market. In the early gender
cases, however, the Court proved willing to accept discriminatory
rules that catered to and thus consolidated existing social conven-
tions. In Hofmann, the Court stated piously that "the directive is not
54. Id. at $ 11. The Commission further argued that "[tihe fact that the leave is
withdrawn in the event of the child's death.. . demonstrates that the leave was cre-
ated in the interests of the child and not the mother." Id. at % 10.
55. Id. at 3075-76, 25-27.
56. Case 163/82, Commission v. Italy, 83 ECR 3273, 3297-98.
57. Id. at 3299, 16.
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designed to settle questions concerned with the organization of the
family, or to alter the division of the responsibility between par-
ents."5 8 By adopting a hands-off approach, the ECJ thus allowed
Member States to settle these questions according to a communal
standard that foreclosed the option for individuals to make nontradi-
tional choices.
Hofmann did mark a departure from earlier cases in one respect.
Whereas prior cases had construed the derogations purely on their
own terms, in Hofmann, the Court moved toward a comparative ap-
proach that grounds the derogation within the underlying equality
norm. Maternity leave may be limited to mothers, and not fathers,
the Court explained, "in view of the fact that it is only the mother
who may find herself subject to undesirable pressures to return to
work prematurely." The leave thus "offset[s] the disadvantages
which women, by comparison with men, suffer with regard to the re-
tention of employment."59
In advancing this argument, the Court drew upon the opinion of
Advocate General Darmon, who had described Article 2(3) as "merely
appear[ing] to make an exception to the principle [of equal treat-
ment]: in aiming to compensate for [disadvantage] it seeks to re-es-
tablish equality and not to prejudice it." Because of this remedial
function premised on existing gender inequality, Darmon argued that
"the exception must be broadly construed."60 Yet, the linkage of Arti-
cle 2(3) to gender differences in fact presaged the beginning of a
stricter approach. If Article 2(3) hinged on differences between men
and women, it followed that where men and women are deemed to be
equally situated derogations would no longer be justified.
In Johnston, the Court signaled the beginning of a tougher ap-
proach to exceptions to equal treatment when it ruled-as it had de-
clined to do in the previous cases-that such derogations "must be
interpreted strictly."1' In doing so, the Court again followed the lead
of its advocate general-none other than AG Darmon.62 Predictably,
the strict interpretation that followed led to the overruling of a com-
munal standard, as Britain's discretion to cater to public opinion was
58. 1984 ECR at 3075, 24.
59. 1984 ECR 3075, I 26-27.
60. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, 1984 ECR at 3082, 9; See also Opin-
ion of Advocate General Tesauro, Case 421/92, Habermann-Beltermann v.
Arbeiterwohlfahrt Bezirksverband Ndb/Opf eV, 1994 ECR 1657, 1664, 1 11. Darmon
was referring in the quoted passage to another provision of the Equal Treatment Di-
rective, Article 2(4). Yet, later in his opinion he describes Article 2(3) as being a spe-
cial case of Article 2(4). Id. at 3086, 91 12.
61. 1986 ECR at 1688, 1 44.
62. See Darmon opinion, 1986 ECR at 1660, 91 9 (calling for strict interpretation of
derogation from fundamental right).
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curtailed. 63 The rationale of the Court built on the comparative ap-
proach introduced in Hofmann. In refusing to permit differential
treatment based on "risks which affect men and women in the same
way," the Court implied that derogations would only be allowed in
situations where there were genuine differences between men and
women (other than in the eyes of the public). 64
What sort of differences counted as genuine? Clearly, differences
related to maternity/pregnancy qualified. Protection in this context
"can be justified by an objective difference between [men and women]
connected with a woman's special biological make-up."65 Would any-
thing else fit the bill? Further light was shed on this question in
Commission v. France where France attempted to justify under Arti-
cle 2(3) a broad assortment of employment privileges granted to wo-
men.6 6 France defended the perks as making allowance for "the de
facto situations existing in most households in France" in which wo-
men bore a double burden of work and home life. The Court, how-
ever, rejected this defense on the ground that many of the privileges
"aim to protect women in their capacity as aged workers or as par-
ents, although male workers can be in these positions as well. '6 7 The
fact that the position of most men differed from most women was ap-
parently not enough.
In refusing to allow France to rely on (and thereby reinforce) de
facto gender norms, the Court recalled the opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Slynn, who had expanded on this theme at some length:
Most of the examples cited of rights given to women are not
justified [because i]t cannot be said that men do not, or may
not ever, need such rights or privileges or that the latter can
be classified as relating solely to the biological condition of
womanhood .... France's insistence on the traditional role of
the mother . . . ignores developments in society whereby
some men in 'single parent families' have the sole responsi-
63. Judgment, 1986 ECR at 1688-89, 44. AG Darmon further generalized that
Article 2(3) protections could never be based on "socio-cultural" reasons when invoked
to reduce the rights of women." Darmon opinion, 1986 at 1659, 8.
64. Id. at 1689, 1 45.
65. Opinion of Advocate General la Pergola, Case 285/98, Kreil v. Federal Repub.
Germ., October 26, 1999, 13.
66. 1988 ECR 6315. The privileges, authorized by French labor law, included "re-
duction of working time for women aged over 59 years of age or engaged in... typing
and computer operating, the advancement of retiring age, time off for the adoption of
a child, leave for sick children, a day off on the first day of the school term, some hours
off on Mothers' Day, payments to help mothers meet the cost of nurseries or
childminders." Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, id. at 6327.
67. Commission v. France, judgment, 1988 E.C.R. at 6336. The "special relation-
ship" between mother and child recognized in Hofmann would thus seem to end
shortly after childbirth.
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bility for children or whereby parents living together decide
that the father will look after the children. 68
This strongly egalitarian rationale went hand in hand with
Slynn's conception of Article 2(3) as a derogation that must be
"strictly construed"69 and marked a further departure from the ECJ's
erstwhile laissez faire approach. The single-sex adoption leave up-
held in Commission v. Italy, for example, would no longer seem com-
patible with a conception of parenting in which mothers and fathers
can play equal roles. 70 Whereas in Hofmann, the Court held that
questions concerned with the organization of family life lay outside
the ambit of the European equality law, Advocate General Jacobs
would later argue, on the contrary, that such questions were its
raison d'etre.
[Alssumptions... that in all marriages the husband will be
the main breadwinner and that any paid work done by the
wife will be no more than ancillary [are] themselves discrim-
inatory. They make no allowance for couples who wish to
organize their lives on alternative lines. It was for the benefit
of such people, among others, that.., the Community's...
legislation on equal treatment for men and women was
adopted. 7 1
EC gender equality law so conceived assumes the subversive role
reminiscent of the German Bier case. Instead of communal stan-
dards imposed by Member States, EC citizens have to be given the
freedom to make individual lifestyle choices that can transcend tradi-
tional gender roles, in the same way that German consumers were
exposed to beers brewed by nontraditional methods.
The endpoint of this jurisprudential migration was registered in
Stoeckel, where the Court found a French law prohibiting night work
by women incompatible with equal treatment. 72 As in Commission v.
France, France had justified the law as helping women reconcile em-
ployment with home life. In rejecting this appeal to protect family
life, the Court recalled the dictum from Hofmann that the directive
was not designed to address questions concerning family responsibili-
68. Slynn Opinion, 1988 ECR at 6328; See also Case 366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre
de l'Economie, judgment, November 29, 2001, 56-58 (similarly rejecting pension
benefits that France granted to female civil servants, but not male).
69. Slynn Opinion, 1988 ECR at 6327.
70. In the Griesmar judgment, the Court distinguished between "biological chil-
dren" and "adopted children," implying that the career disadvantages related to ma-
ternity leave might be more easily presumed for the former. 2001 ECR at 52. This
suggests that adoption leave may no longer be viewed as falling within the core focus
of Article 2(3).
71. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, October 25, 1990, Case 373/89, Caisse
d'Assur. Soc. Pour Travailleurs Independ. [a.k.a. Integrity v. Rouvroy], 1990 ECR
4243, 13-14 (emphasis added).
72. Case 345/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Stoeckel, 1991 ECR 4047.
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ties.73 In doing so, the Court turns the dictum on its head. In Hof-
mann, the ECJ allowed Member States to reinforce traditional
gender roles because the directive was held to be neutral in such mat-
ters. In Stoeckel, the exact opposite occurred; the directive precluded
the instantiation of a gender stereotype.
As in Johnston, the Court also found that "the risks to which wo-
men are exposed when working at night [were not] inherently differ-
ent from those [affecting] men."74 Any additional security risks
affecting women, it held, could be dealt with by "appropriate mea-
sures . . .without undermining the fundamental principle of equal
treatment. '75 In refusing to allow a derogation in light of non-dis-
criminatory alternatives, the Court came close to invoking the "no
less restrictive means" standard that it routinely applies in its free
movement cases.
Stoeckel's seemingly strict approach to equality did not apply,
however, in one aspect where men and women were seen genuinely to
differ. Whereas the Court considered the prohibition on night work
by women, in general, to be based on outdated ideas of female vulner-
ability, it accepted a ban on such work by pregnant women unques-
tioningly. 76 Pregnancy, for the Court of Justice, remains the
immutable boundary that EC equality law will not penetrate, where
gender difference is reduced to hard, biological fact. Once women be-
come pregnant, they fall automatically within the ambit of Article
2(3) and become eligible for special protection, with little or no pro-
portionality controls.77
This biologically-grounded understanding of Article 2(3) helps to
explains the apparent contradiction between Hofmann and Johnston,
in which both Darmon and the Court switched from a deferential
reading of Article 2(3) to a strict interpretation in cases a mere two
years apart. In Hofmann, the measure given deferential review dealt
explicitly with maternity, the textual focus of Article 2(3). Johnston,
by contrast, involved the protection of women for social reasons, as
did Commission v. France and Stoeckel; strict review applied. Subse-
quent case law has confirmed this bifurcated approach in which pro-
tections outside Article 2(3)'s core receive much stricter review.78
73. Id. at 4067, 17 (citing Hofmann, 1984 ECR 3075, at 24).
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id. at 16.
76. See Case 421/92, Habermann-Beltermann v. Arbeiterwohlfahrt Bezirksver-
band Ndb/Opf eV, 1994 ECR 1657, 1675, 18 ("prohibition on night-time work by
pregnant women ... is unquestionably compatible with Article 2(3)").
77. Cf. Kilpatrick, "How Long is a Piece of String? European Regulation of the
Post-Birth Period," in Hervey & O'Keefe, supra n. 10, at 96 (1996) (likening this ab-
sence of judicial scrutiny to "a black hole" within equality law).
78. Thus, in Abdoulaye, the ECJ upheld payments to women taking maternity
leave without requiring any proportionality test, while in Griesmar, the Court re-jected payments for child-rearing. Compare Case 218/98, Abdoulaye v. Regie Nat'le
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In fact, the ECJ has yet to sanction any derogations under Arti-
cle 2(3) outside the context of maternity and pregnancy, although the
text of the Directive and formal structure of the Court's opinions sug-
gest this is not ruled out in principle. 79 The Court of Justice has up-
held unequal treatment based on biological differences other than
pregnancy in an equal pay case dealing with pension funding.80 It
remains to be seen if the ECJ would do so under Article 2(3).
B. Article 2(2)
Article 2(2) permits Member States to maintain sex-specific qual-
ifications for "occupational activities and, where appropriate, the
training leading thereto, for which, by reason of their nature or the
context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker consti-
tutes a determining factor.""' Unlike Articles 2(3) and 2(4), which
can be said to complement formal equal treatment by remedying pre-
existing inequalities, Article 2(2) fits most closely the classical para-
digm of a derogation that is wholly exceptional. As such, one might
expect such measures to be held to especially strict limits.
8 2
In fact, this has not been the case. One reason may be that, un-
like Article 2(3) derogations which have a purpose tied to objective,
biological differences, Article 2(2) makes the justification for gender-
specific qualifications dependent on the "nature [of the activity] or
the context in which they are carried out." Moreover, such deroga-
tions are to be "periodically assessed in the light of social develop-
ments."8 3 Such open-ended criteria implicate subjective, socially-
mediated variables whose content may vary between Member States.
In such cases, the ECJ prefers to defer to Member States govern-
ments to decide when gender qualifications are in principle war-
ranted,8 4 just as it defers to Member States to determine public
des Usines Renault SA, 1999 ECR 5723, I 22, with Griesmar judgment, Nov. 29,
2001, at TT 52-55.
79. Compare Slynn Opinion, Commission v. France ("the word 'particularly' in
Article 2(3) [contemplates] situations other than pregnancy and maternity"), 1988 at
ECR 6327-28, with la Pergola opinion, Kreil, $T 13, 23 (disagreeing).
80. Case 200/91, Coloroll v. Russell, 1994 ECR 4389 (permitting greater employer
contributions for female employee pensions than for male reflecting the longer aver-
age lifespans of women). The Court did so, however, by ruling that such contributions
lay outside the scope of EC equality law entirely. Id. at 4424, T 76.
81. Actors/actresses, fashion models, and prison guards are examples of jobs that
may require sex-specific qualifications.
82. The American analogue under Title VII, known as bona fide occupational
qualifications (BFOQs), for example, have been narrowly construed. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
83. ETD, Art. 9(2).
84. See Prechal & Burrows, supra n. 2, at 156 (linking "margin of appreciation"
left to Member States in Article 2(2) to variation in social environment between Mem-
ber States).
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morality grounds for derogations from free movement.8 5 The Euro-
pean Court thus reads Article 2(2), unlike Article 2(3), to explicitly
sanction the instantiation of communally-determined norms. Despite
the attempts of a few Advocate Generals to subject such norms to
scrutiny, the Court has generally assumed that Article 2(2) deroga-
tions have a legitimate aim and focused instead on whether the
means were proportionate and confined to a specific context.
The assumption that derogations under Article 2(2) are always
provisional, subject to the periodic reassessments required by Article
9(2) may provide a further explanation for the Court's willingness to
defer. Advocate General Darmon stressed this evolutionary aspect of
Article 2(2) in Hofmann, which he argued revealed legislative intent
that the directive not "create rights where none exist but that it
seek[ I to equalize rights at work wherever the development of social
attitudes so permits."8 6 More recently, however, Advocate General la
Pergola implied that Member States bore some responsibility to take
steps to combat discriminatory attitudes that impede gender
integration.8 7
An early case, Commission v. United Kingdom, examined
whether restrictions on male midwives could be justified under Arti-
cle 2(2).88 The advocate general, siding with the Commission, had
pushed for a strict interpretation, arguing that the fact that the UK
did permit male midwives men to train and work in two cities called
into question the need for restrictions elsewhere.8 9 She also noted
that Britain had no similar restriction on obstetricians. 90 The Court
did not address these arguments. It merely recognized that mid-
wifery involved "personal sensitivities" that could make gender a rel-
evant consideration and upheld the restriction as an appropriate
response "at the present time."9 1 As with the early Article 2(3) cases,
the ECJ never entered into an assessment of proportionality. Ignor-
ing Advocate General Rozes' suggestion that patient sensitivities
could be addressed by giving patients the option of requesting a fe-
male midwife, the Court essentially deferred to the British govern-
ment's judgment as to when and how the profession should be opened
to men.
85. See, e.g., Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd. v. Her Majesty's Customs & Excise, 1986
ECR 1007, 1023.
86. Opinion of AG Darmon, 1984 ECR 3082, at 9 (discussing Article 2(2) in re-
viewing the overall structure of the ETD).
87. Opinion of AG la Pergola, Case 273/97, Sirdar v. Army Bd., May 19, 1999,
46 (suggesting that "the attitude shown by the Member State [in promoting gender]
sensitivity]" weigh as a factor in assessing proportionality).
88. Case 165/82, Commission v. United Kingdom, 83 ECR 3431.
89. Id. at 3460.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 20.
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The Court took a more assertive stance in another aspect of Com-
mission v. United Kingdom, when it invalidated the exclusion of
small workplaces and domestic workers from equal treatment, re-
jecting Britain's categorical approach as unnecessarily broad. 92 The
Court thus established that derogations under Article 2(2) must be
justified by specific tasks, not generalized categories.
The Court expanded on this precedent in in re French Civil Ser-
vice, a case challenging French gender quotas for police and prison
posts. 9 3 Following Johnston, Advocate General Slynn had started
from the premise that, as a derogation, "Article 2(2) is to be construed
narrowly."94 He proceeded to examine with a skeptical eye France's
claim that women policemen were not suitable "to perform police du-
ties which involve[d] the display of force." Slynn dismissed the fact
that "on average men are bigger and stronger than women," because
some women could still compete physically with men. Although con-
ceding that "potential delinquents [might] regard men as more ready
to use force," he suggested "that in some situations with which the
police have to deal the presence of women could be a deterrent to
violence."95 Moreover, even if men were better suited for such tasks,
Slynn found the French quotas "disproportionate" in that they ap-
plied to all five corps of the national police and were not limited to
"police officers who regularly do, or are regularly liable to" deal with
violence.96
This latter of aspect of Slynn's opinion was followed by the Court.
Rather than investigate the extent to which women could or could not
handle particular tasks, the Court simply took it as a given that cer-
tain police tasks were best left to men, but others were not. The
Court then confirmed that as a derogation from an individual right,
Article 2(2) measures must not "exceed the limits of what is neces-
sary to achieve the legitimate objective [and be] reconcile[d], as far as
possible [with] equal treatment."9 7 Moreover, the derogations must
"relate only to specific activities [and] be sufficiently transparent so
as to permit effective supervision."98 The Court held that France's
92. 83 ECR 3431, [ 14-15.
93. Case 318/86, in re French Civ. Serv. [Commission v. France II, 1988 ECR
3559.
94. Opinion of AG Slynn, id. at 3570.
95. Id. at 3571-72 (noting that in other countries "women now appear to play [a
role] in warfare and in police forces").
96. Id. at 3571.
97. Judgment, 1988 ECR at 3582, 28. Ergo, unlike the midwife case, propor-
tionality controls applied.
98. This emphasis on effective supervision built on an earlier ruling in Commis-
sion v. Germany that had stressed the role of the Commission in supervising Articles
2(2) to ensure that Member States "eliminate progressively existing exceptions which
no longer appear justified," as Article 9(2) requires. Case 248/83, Commission v. Ger-
many, 1985 ECR 1459, 1486, 37-39. The French police ruling now added another
layer of supervision: that of the courts.
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use of fixed quotas failed these latter tests because the restrictions
were neither linked to specific activities and "no[r] governed by any
objective criterion defined in a legislative provision." Since the Court
could not exercise independent review over the quotas, it held them
unjustified. 99 By invoking transparency and specificity as require-
ments of proportionality, the ECJ equipped itself with the tools for
more assertive judicial review. In doing so, the Court emphasized-
as it does in free movement cases-that the exercise of an Article 2(2)
derogation could not be made by Member States unilaterally. 100
The ECJ's earlier handling of the Article 2(2) issue in Johnston
was more questionable. 10 1 In formal terms, the Court's analysis was
impeccable. It recognized Article 2(2) as a derogation that must be
interpreted strictly and subjected to a test of proportionality focused
on specific policing functions. 0 2 What was troubling about the judg-
ment, however, was its acceptance of the very premise that underlay
the UK's exclusion of women from the Ulster police force. The Court
held that "the possibility cannot be excluded that in a situation
characterised by serious internal disturbances the carrying of fire-
arms by policewoman might create additional risks of their being as-
sassinated and might therefore be contrary to the requirements of
public safety."10 3 Yet, there was no evidence of this beyond the con-
clusory assertion of the police chief who ordered the exclusion pol-
icy.10 4 Moreover, as we saw, the Court had found in its Article 2(3)
analysis that "the risks and dangers to which women are exposed
when performing their duties in the police force in a situation such as
exists in Northern Ireland are [not] different from those to which any
man is also exposed. 105
Formally, the Court deferred to the referring national court "to
say whether the reasons [for the exclusion were] well founded" and
99. Id. at 3581-82, $% 25-27.
100. ECJ's shift to a stricter approach became less convincing in its handling of the
second issue in the case, a challenge to the single-sex basis on which the posts of
prison warden were filled. The Court had accepted France's claimed need to promote
from within the ranks of prison guards, whose single-sex status was not contested,
without putting the policy to a proportionality test that would have entailed an inde-
pendent assessment of this necessity. 1988 ECR at 3580.
101. Britain had alleged justifications under both Article 2(2) and 2(3). Johnston,
1986 ECR at 1672.
102. Id. at 1686-87, 36-38.
103. 1986 ECR at 1686-87, 36. Note the broad license implicit in the Court's
phrase "it cannot be excluded."
104. See Opinion of Advocate General la Pergola, Case 273/97, Sirdar v. Army Bd.,
1999 ECR 7403, 7424, 34 (characterizing the Johnston Court's ruling as based on
"unsubstantiated 'forecasts"; See also Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its
Court of Justice 90 (1999) (describing sexist views of police chief who formed the
policy).
105. 1986 ECR at 1689, 45. This discrepancy between Johnston's Article 2(2)
and 2(3) analysis was never resolved.
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proportionate. 10 6 Yet, the fact that the ECJ accepted such a dubious
and internally contradictory premise even in principle demonstrates
the Court's obvious unwillingness to second guess the British govern-
ment on a national security issue during a time of emergency. 10 7
That the Court yielded under Article 2(2) instead of Article 2(3)
reveals the greater tolerance for communal gender standards under
the former. Advocate General Darmon had been open about this, ex-
plicitly stating that socio-cultural values could be accommodated
under Article 2(2), but not 2(3).ls The Court may have also felt that
a ruling under Article 2(2) would do less long-term damage in the
long run, given its provisional and contextually contingent nature.
A similar set of issues returned to the ECJ in a pair of cases a
decade later. In Sirdar,10 9 a female army chef challenged the all-
male composition of the British Royal Marines. Although most Brit-
ish military posts had been opened to women, the marines justified
its male-only policy based on its status as an elite combat unit that
served as "the point of the arrow head." To fulfill this role, the
marine corps enforced a rule of interoperability that required all per-
sonnel in the corps to be capable of combat, a requirement it claimed
was incompatible with female members. 110
Britain had argued for a deferential standard of judicial review
"confine[d] to the question of whether the national authorities could
reasonably have formed the view that the policy in issue was neces-
sary and appropriate.""' The Commission had pushed for applica-
tion of a more rigorous proportionality test. The Court seemed to side
with the Commission initially. It ruled "that, as a derogation from an
individual right[, Article 2(2)] must be interpreted strictly."11 2 Ac-
cordingly, proportionality had to be applied in order to ensure that
"the principle of equal treatment [is] reconciled as far as possible
with the requirements" of public security. 1 3 On the other hand, the
Court observed that, "national authorities have a certain degree of
discretion when adopting measure which they consider to be neces-
sary [for] public security."1 14 The Court then found that the elite sta-
106. Id. at 1687, $ 38.
107. The Court's handoff contained more than a whiff of expediency, and its fram-
ing of the proportionality test seemed aimed more at damage control than real scru-
tiny. Rather than focusing on whether the seemingly implausible justification
actually held up to analysis, the Court appeared mainly concerned with minimizing
the burden imposed on Mrs. Johnston, instructing the national court to determine
whether it might be possible to "allocat[e] to [Mrs. Johnson] duties which ... can be
performed without firearms." 1986 ECR at 1687, 39.
108. Compare Darmon opinion, 1659, 8; with id. at 1660, 9.
109. Case 273/97, Sirdar v. Army Bd., 1999 ECR 7403.
110. Sirdar, Judgment, % 7, 30
111. Id. at T 22.
112. Sirdar Judgment, id. at 23.
113. Id. at T 26.
114. Id. at 27.
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tus of the marines had been established, "that, within [the] corps,
chefs are indeed required to serve as front-line commandos [(neces-
sity)], that all members of the corps are engaged and trained for that
purpose, and that there are no exceptions to this rule [(consis-
tency)]. 1 15 "In such circumstances," the Court held, "the competent
authorities were entitled, in the exercise of their discretion . . . to
come to the view that [these circumstances] justified the [marine
corps] remaining exclusively male."1 6 In other words, the Court re-
verted to much the same deferential standard that the UK had
sought at the outset, confirming the withdrawal from strictness im-
plicit in Johnston.
In some ways, Sirdar may be considered an improvement over its
predecessor. National security is a more sensitive area than other
public employment contexts and the Court probably lacks the institu-
tional expertise to enforce strict proportionality limits. 1 1 7 By explic-
itly recognizing a margin of discretion in this area, the Court avoided
the strained credulity that had marred its previous ruling and lim-
ited the precedential harm. Yet, it is troubling that nowhere in its
opinion did the Court explain why the role assigned to the marine
corps was deemed incompatible with female members. Was it be-
cause women could not fulfill the job of "front-line commandos"? Be-
cause their presence would have undermined military discipline? Or
simply because Britain was entitled to keep women out of combat for
cultural reasons?"18 By ruling only that the decision was within an
allowable margin of discretion, the Court avoided the need to answer
such questions. 11 9
A more forthright approach was taken by Advocate General la
Pergola, who deferred to Britain's military authorities as to the ne-
cessity of interoperability, but still questioned whether at least some
women could fulfill the requirements. He dismissed "the argument
that women are physically inferior to men," noting several countries
that "permitt[ed] women in all units, including. . . those correspond-
ing to the Royal Marines.' 20 Moreover, studies by the Canadian mil-
itary showed that the presence of women did not compromise combat
effectiveness and, "far from undermining military cohesion, in fact
115. Id. at 30.
116. Sirdar, Judgment, 'I 31 (emphasis added).
117. See de Bdrca, supra n. 18, at 132-33; cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10
(1973) ("It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which court
have less competence" than military affairs).
118. If the exclusion was justified purely on cultural grounds unrelated to military
necessity then it is hard to see why such a policy could be deemed to "have the pur-
pose of guaranteeing public security."
119. Cf. St. J. Macdonald, "The Margin of Appreciation," in R. Macdonald, H.
Petzold, & F. Matscher, (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human
Rights (1993) (criticizing such ambiguous rulings).
120. Opinion of AG la Pergola, 32 n.50.
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even reinforced the esprit de corps."121 In pursuing this line of in-
quiry, La Pergola assessed the justification for the exclusion policy on
the basis of functional criteria, much as Advocate General Slynn had
done for French police work.122
Another military case, Kreil, came before the Court of Justice a
year later, this time a challenge to a much broader exclusion of wo-
men from the German military. 123 In keeping with a constitutional
provision that women "may on no account render service involving
the use of arms,"124 Germany restricted women to voluntary service
in the medical and military-music services. 125 The restriction sought
to ensure that women would neither be exposed to enemy fire, nor
become prisoners of war.' 26
This time, La Pergola made explicit the theme he had introduced
in Sirdar. He suggested that derogations under Article 2(2) were per-
missible only where "sex is so much a determining factor that a non-
discriminatory employment policy would make it extremely difficult
or indeed impossible to fulfill the functions of [a particular] post.' 27
In other words, sex qualifications had to be justified instrumentally.
Yet, the German government had conceded "that there was abso-
lutely no doubt as to the suitability of either Ms. Kreil or women gen-
erally to serve in the [military's] armed units.' 28  They were
excluded on moral grounds, not functional, backed by constitutional
imperative.
La Pergola did not exclude the relevance of cultural values en-
tirely. Article 2(2) derogations could "reflect[ I the cultural fabric of a
country at a specific point in time," he acknowledged, but only where
linked to "specific requirements, closely bound up with the nature of
an activity or ... context."' 29 Making broader allowance for "social
requirements," would permit too much license to Member States to
violate equal treatment, "a fundamental human right."130 In other
words, cultural norms still had to fit within a functional frame-
work.' 31 La Pergola noted that no other EU or NATO military re-
tained such a categorical ban on women (thereby branding Germany
as an outlier).132
121. La Pergola Opinion, 45.
122. See supra no. 94-95 and accompanying text. Ultimately, la Pergola would
have left it to the national court to decide.
123. Case 285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000 ECR 69.
124. Id. at [ 4 (quoting Article 12a of the German Constitution).
125. Id. at 3-6.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 16 (citing V.T. Hervey, sect. 4.2.1.3 (1993)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id. at 20.
131. Id. at 23.
132. Id. at 16 & n.29, 30. The only other laggard, Italy, was in the process of
opening its military to women. Id. at n.30. La Pergola's attempt to assess "social
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Finally, La Pergola rejected an attempt to assimilate the Ger-
man exclusion to the inter-operability" rationale of Sirdar. La Per-
gola observed that a similar claim of "interchangeability" in the
French police case had been rejected. 133 The facts of this case, he
argued, resembled the latter as it involved a much broader range of
positions than the British marines whose tasks were "becoming ever
more specialised.' 13 4 La Pergola therefore concluded that the exclu-
sion was unjustified.' 3 5
The Court of Justice adopted a different approach. It began by
restating the two questions posed in Sirdar: Did the measures taken
"have the purpose of guaranteeing public security and [were they] ap-
propriate and necessary to achieve that aim."1 3 6 One might think the
answer to the first question was obvious: no. Germany adopted the
exclusion to protect female soldiers, not public security in the usual
broad sense.' 37 Did the Court mean to equate the two?' 3 8 If not, was
the Court suggesting that public security could be the only legitimate
purpose here? If so, this would seem an endorsement of la Pergola's
functionalist approach. Yet, the Court never addressed the question
of purpose. The analysis that followed focused only on the propor-
tionality of the chosen means.
The Court first stated that "[in view of its scope, such an exclu-
sion, which applies to almost all military posts ... cannot be regarded
as a derogating measure justified by the specific nature of the posts
in question or by the particular context in which the activities in
question are carried out."1 39 In fact, in light of its true purpose, the
exclusion was fairly accurately drawn: Women had been excluded
from all military posts which were likely to expose them to hostile fire
or enemy capture.' 40
The Court continued with the observation that:
the fact that persons serving in those forces may be called on
to use arms cannot in itself justify the exclusion of women
developments" by reference to other Member States-the judicial equivalent of peer
pressure-was questionable, however, because Article 2(2) derogations were intended
to be country-specific.
133. La Pergola Opinion, 36 (contrasting the two claims).
134. Id. at [ 27-28.
135. Id. at 30. For the sake of completeness, la Pergola also considered whether
the exclusion was proportionate; he concluded that it was not because it was both
over- and under-inclusive with respect to its stated aims. Id. at 34-36.
136. Kreil judgment, 1999 ECR at 106, [ 25.
137. The legislative history and constitutional grounding of the exclusion policy
could not be plainer. See la Pergola Opinion, 1999 ECR at 77-78, 12.
138. The ECJ's blurring of these two different aims recalled its Johnston judgment
which similarly described the possible assassination of female police officers as "con-
trary to the requirements of public safety." Johnston, 1986 ECR at 1687.
139. Kreil judgment, 27.
140. A stronger criticism would be that the exclusion was underinclusive in that it
did not protect women in civilian posts who worked alongside the military. See la
Pergola opinion, 1999 ECR 91, 1% 33-34.
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from access to military posts. As the German Government
explained, in the services of the Bundeswehr that are acces-
sible to women, basic training in the use of arms, to enable
personnel in those services to defend themselves and to as-
sist others, is provided. 141
This line of argument (suggesting an inconsistency) was not con-
vincing either. A minimal level of prophylactic training cannot be
equated with military operations that deliberately put their partici-
pants in harm's way. Would the Court's judgment change if such
training were to cease? Note also that the Court here understood
Germany's aim as explicitly protective: to keep women away from
fighting. But instead of directly confronting this aim, whose legiti-
macy had been called into question by la Pergola, the Court kept its
sights fixed firmly on the means chosen, concluding:
In those circumstances, even taking account of the discretion
which they have.., the national authorities could not, with-
out contravening the principle of proportionality, adopt the
general position that the composition of all armed units...
had to remain exclusively male. 142
Given its conclusory nature, this last proposition was hard to dis-
pute. La Pergola offered plenty of reasons why the exclusion could be
considered disproportionate. It did not prevent woman in the Ger-
man military's numerous civilian posts working alongside combat
troops from coming into peril. It was outdated, overbroad and non-
transparent. It kept too many plum jobs for the boys (and ensured
veterans' preferences for them afterward). 143 The Court's impreci-
sion also suggested a more general meaning: that it was willing to
tolerate a limited derogation to appease German cultural values, but
the scope here was simply to massive to stomach.
What is clear, however, is the ECJ's determination to avoid con-
fronting the issue of purpose head on. Indeed, one might suspect that
the whole exercise was really just a diplomatic way for the Court to
say it objected to the exclusion on principle, as sexist. Yet, the failure
of the Court to articulate a more convincing rationale points to the
weakness of means scrutiny as a surrogate.
Kreil is not the only Article 2(2) case where the Court avoided
scrutiny of purpose. The Court was just as evasive as to the reason
for the exclusion of women in Sirdar and (to a lesser extent) John-
ston. Moreover, in every case in which the Court has found a discrim-
inatory measure to be unjustified under Article 2(2), it has done so by
holding that the means were disproportionate to the stated end,
rather than declaring the end itself illegitimate. In Commission v.
141. Kreil judgment, 1999 ECR at 106, 28.
142. Id. at 29.
143. See la Pergola opinion, 35.
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United Kingdom, the Court held the blanket exemption for employ-
ment in private households to be overly broad in scope. The same
was true of the hiring quota in the French police case, and of Kreil
itself. The exclusion policy in Kreil was also criticized for not being
broad enough since women still received training in arms.144 By fo-
cusing on the scrutiny of means, rather than purpose, the Court
avoids having to pass judgment on gender roles in employment, a
subjective and culturally contingent question that is likely to be both
highly emotive and deeply contested.
This avoidance of purpose scrutiny is not at all true of Article
2(3) cases, however. In fact, the reverse applies: Where the Court
has rejected Article 2(3) justifications, it has consistently done so by
pronouncing the purpose impermissible. In Commission v. France,
the ECJ held that Article 2(3) did not authorize protection of women
in capacities that they shared with men, a ruling implicit in the
Court's treatment of the "family responsibility" issue in Stoeckel.
Similarly, in Johnston, women could not be protected against risks
that affected men too. This was also the line taken in Stoeckel.145
As already noted, the difference between Article 2(2) and Article
2(3) is rooted in the biological basis that undergirds the latter. As the
ECJ began to apply stricter scrutiny to Article 2(3) cases, it stripped
away the social meanings of gender as impermissible stereotypes, re-
ducing Article 2(3) protection to its biological core of pregnancy and
maternity. This winnowing process functioned entirely at the level of
purpose. The Court could perform this purpose scrutiny because it
had a textual anchor on which to fall back. It did not have to pro-
nounce broader purposes as illegitimate per se, but could say merely
that they were not the purposes for which Article 2(3) was intended.
By contrast, Article 2(2) is by design inseparable from social con-
text.146 The result is that the ECJ has steered away from purpose
scrutiny. Thus, in Johnston, the Court accepted in principle the justi-
fication offered by the British police chief and refused to confront the
blatant stereotypes on which it seemed to be founded, notwithstand-
ing its willingness to do so under Article 2(3) in the very same case.
Instead, the Court relied on a strictly-worded proportionality test to
do the work ofjudicial review. By invoking proportionality, the Court
asks whether the means fit the end, shifting the spotlight from pur-
pose to method. As a substitute for purpose scrutiny, context (i.e.
144. This ruling by a strict-minded court in Kreil may be contrasted with the mid-
wife case, where a (deferential) Court permitted Britain to open the profession to men
in two cities, but not others.
145. The Court did invoke proportionality in Stoeckel to deal with security risks
that the Court acknowledged might affect women to a greater extent than men. The
structure of the Court's judgment makes clear, however, that the proportionality ar-
gument was a secondary, fallback position. Stoeckel, 1991 ECR at 4066, T 16.
146. AG Darmon made this distinction between Articles 2(2) and 2(3) explicit in
Hofmann. See 1986 ECR at 1659-60.
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specificity) has become the key battleground in Article 2(2) cases.
Stricter scrutiny has meant a narrowing of focus, as the Court sought
to contain the genie of social subjectivism within the confines of spe-
cific employment functions. 147 This contextual straight-jacket forces
Member States to justify their derogations through an logic of instru-
mental necessity and thus steers the debate away from broader value
judgments about gender roles. It is no accident therefore that the
French police, British marines, and German Bundeswehr all invoked
some variant of the interoperability principle to try to extrapolate
outwards from their strongest contextual claims.
This reliance on proportionality and specificity as the weapons of
choice has its limitations, however, as the Kreil judgment's shortcom-
ings revealed. La Pergola's more explicitly functionalist approach of-
fers an attractive alternative. However, the Court's embrace of the
logic of functionalism has never been as fulsome as that of its advo-
cate generals. To do so would require the Court to openly declare
that non-instrumental justifications are no longer acceptable-trig-
gering the very debate over purpose that it has so assiduously
avoided. It remains possible, however, that the Court will go further
towards purpose scrutiny via functionalism as cases arise in less sen-
sitive realms than the national security questions addressed in its
last three Article 2(2) judgments.
Article 2(4)
Article 2(4) permits sex-specific measures "to promote equal op-
portunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing ine-
qualities which affect women's opportunities." More than one
Advocate General has commented on the affinity between Articles
2(3) and 2(4).148 Just as Article 2(3) serves to offset the disadvan-
tages of maternity, so affirmative action under Article 2(4) targets
other obstacles that hold back women's careers. 149 Unlike Article
2(3), however, Article 2(4) "is not linked any specific condition of wo-
men but relates to all women" 150 (and perhaps men).151 As with Arti-
147. Cf. Johnston, 1986 ECR 1686, 34 (Article 2(2) derogation "must be examined
[in] the specific context in which the [allegedly sex-specific] activity is carried out.").
148. Opinion of AG Darmon, Hofmann, 1984 ECR at 3082, 9; Opinion of Advo-
cate General Tesauro, Case 450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 ECR
3061-62 [Hereafter cited as Tesauro], 17.
149. Indeed, Advocate General Darmon viewed Article 2(3) in Hofmann as a spe-
cial case of the broader principles embodied in Article 2(4). 1984 ECR at 3086, 12.
150. Tesauro, 18.
151. Although affirmative action is normally restricted to women, in Schnorbus,
the ECJ upheld preferential treatment of applicants who had completed military ser-
vice-a class composed exclusively of men. Case 79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hessen,
Judgment of December 7, 2000, [ 44-46. Schnorbus was analyzed as an indirect
discrimination case; yet, its rationale would seem applicable to Article 2(4).
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cle 2(2), the challenge for the Court has therefore been to contain the
broad discretion this open-ended provision would otherwise confer.
In Commission v. France, the first case that addressed Article
2(4) directly, Advocate General Slynn cautioned that "[i]t is not per-
missible to argue ... that because women in general have been dis-
criminated against then any provisions in favour of women in the
employment field are per se valid as part of an evening-up process."
Slynn noted that the privileges had "never been enjoyed by men," 152
suggesting that a sort of symmetry applied: Article 2(4) would only
sanction preferential treatment of women in the context of a preexist-
ing inequality. The Court appeared to expand on Slynn's insight in
its judgment, construing Article 2(4) to have "the precise, limited ob-
ject of authorising measures which, although discriminatory in ap-
pearance, actually aim to eliminate or reduce de facto instances of
inequality which may exist in actual working life."153 It then held
that France had not offered evidence to show that any of the perks
served this aim.1 54
It was left to Advocate General Tesauro in Kalanke to make
sense of this rather ambiguous holding. Kalanke concerned an em-
ployment decision in which a female candidate had been preferred
over an equally qualified male, based on a law giving preference to
the underrepresented sex. The question for the ECJ was whether the
preference could be justified under Article 2(4).
The Advocate General began by drawing a basic distinction be-
tween "starting points" (opportunities) and "points of arrival" (out-
comes).1 55 He saw Article 2(4) as solely concerned with measures to
equalize the former. Leveling the playing field between men and wo-
men would put "people in a position to attain equal results," without
guaranteeing the results directly.' 56
By contrast, Tesauro saw the preference in Kalanke as concerned
solely with outcomes. Favoring the underrepresented sex would
rebalance numbers without remedying the obstacles that caused the
imbalance.1 57 Moreover, because the two candidates had "equivalent
qualification, [he argued] by definition that the two candidates have
had and continue to have equal opportunities."158
152. 1988 ECR at 6329.
153. Commission v. France, judgment, 1988 ECR 6336-37, T 15.
154. Id.
155. Tesauro, 13.
156. Id. at 13, 16-17, 25. As examples of starting points, Tesauro envisioned
vocational counseling and training to upgrade women's qualifications and subsidized
child-care, to reduce the burdens of home life. Id. at I 9, 18-19.
157. Tesauro 18, 28 (dismissing "numbers battle" as yielding "illusory" gains "de-
void of all substance").
158. Tesauro, 13. Tesauro's reasoning assumes that selections were made solely
based on qualifications. In fact, they were based partly on "social criteria" discrimina-
tory to women. See Schiek, "Positive Action in Community Law," 25 Indus. L.J. 239,
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Despite the remedial promise of affirmative action, Tesauro still
viewed Article 2(4) as a derogation subject to a strict proportionality
test.159 He pointed to the "element of arbitrariness inherent in any
preferential treatment which is mechanically confined to the under-
represented group and based solely on that ground." 160 Such arbi-
trariness, Tesauro argued, belied the remedial purpose of the prefer-
ence and was disproportionate to this aim.' 6 '
The judgment of the Court in Kalanke largely followed Tesauro.
It noted that as "a derogation from an individual right ... Article 2(4)
must be interpreted strictly." 62 The Court then held that national
laws such as Bremen's failed this strict standard for two reasons.
First, the Court stated that "[n]ational rules which guarantee women
absolute and unconditional priority go beyond promoting equal op-
portunities and overstep the limits of the exception in Article 2(4)."163
Second, the Court held that "in so far as it seeks to achieve equal
representation of men and women in all grades and levels within a
department, such a system substitutes for equality of opportunity as
envisaged in Article 2(4) the result which is only to be arrived at by
providing such equality of opportunity."16 4
The Kalanke judgment provoked widespread controversy, ulti-
mately leading to an amendment of Treaty Article 119 specifically to
encourage affirmative action. 165 Moreover, the sparse reasoning and
somewhat cryptic wording of the judgment left confusion as to its
meaning. 166 The judgment appeared to state two distinct reasons for
invalidating the preference, objecting to both the form and purpose of
the preference. In objecting to the "absolute and unconditional" form
of the preference, the Court portrayed it as "automatically giv[ing]
priority to women in sectors where they are underrepresented"-mir-
roring Tesauro's criticism of the preference's "mechanical" nature.
Similarly, the characterization of the preference as aiming at a result
(equal representation) came unmistakably from Tesauro's opportu-
240 (1996) (noting Kalanke was given priority because he had a dependent as well as
seniority).
159. Tesauro, 23. Tesauro seemed to contradict his earlier suggestion that Arti-
cle 2(4) was not a "genuine derogation" because it complemented the principle of for-
mal equality. Id. at % 17; cf AG Darmon in Hofmann, 1984 ECR at 3082.
160. Tesauro, 24.
161. Id.
162. Kalanke judgment, 1995 ECR at 3078, at J 21.
163. Id. at 22.
164. Id. at 23.
165. See Senden, "Positive Action in the EU Put to the Test: A Negative Score?," 3
Maastr. J. Eur. Comp. L. 146 (1996) (re: controversial nature of judgment); Shaw,
supra n. 8, at 104 (Treaty language inserted at Amsterdam based on fallout from
Kalanke); See also Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 76/207/EEC,
OJ, C-179, p.8 (proposed "clarification" in Kalanke aftermath).
166. Many commentators saw Kalanke as sounding a death knell for affirmative
action in Europe. See Douglas-Scot, "Ruling Out Affirmative Action," 21 Eur. L. Rev.
1586 (1995); Senden, supra n. 165, at 146.
[Vol. 51
HeinOnline -- 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 580 2003
STRICTNESS VS. DISCRETION
nity/outcome distinction. 16 7 It was unclear, however, whether these
objections represented independent grounds for the judgment or were
somehow related.
An opportunity for clarification arose two years later when Mar-
schall,1 68 a case with almost identical facts, came before the Court.
The only difference was the addition of proviso that the preference for
the underrepresented sex could be withheld where "reasons specific
to another [i.e. male] candidate tilt the balance in his favor.' 6 9 This
"savings clause" was designed to address Court's "absolute and un-
conditional" objection in Kalanke.
Advocate General Jacobs was of the opinion that preference still
concerned outcomes, not opportunities and thus fell within Kalanke's
second objection. 170 The Marschall Court, however, took a different
view. It observed that:
even when male and female candidates are equally qualified,
male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to female
candidates particularly because of prejudice and stereotypes
concerning the role and capacities of women in working life
and the fear, for example, that women will interrupt their
careers more frequently, that owing to household and family
duties they will be less flexible in their working hours, or
that they will be absent from work more frequently because
of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding. 17 1
In acknowledging the prejudices that women faced in the em-
ployment market, the Court clearly rejected Tesauro's assumption
that equal qualifications meant equal opportunity.' 7 2 The Court
therefore reasoned that preferences to women "may fall within the
scope of Article 2(4) if such a rule may counteract [prejudice against]
female candidates ... and thus reduce actual instances of inequality
which may exist in the real world.' 7 3 The tentative language here
showed that the Court's reasoning was contingent. The purpose may
be viewed as equalizing starting points, not outcomes only if one can
assume there is preexisting prejudice to counteract. Yet, the only in-
dicator of prejudice in the case at hand was the numerical fact of un-
derrepresentation-hardly an unambiguous criterion. Indeed, for
Tesauro the linkage to underrepresentation showed just the opposite:
that the preference aimed at an outcome (balancing numbers) instead
167. Cf. Tesauro, T[ 25
168. Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen, 1997 ECR 6363.
169. Id. at [1 13, 24.
170. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 1997 ECR at 6374-75, 32-33.
171. Marschall judgment, 91 29.
172. Jacobs had echoed Tesauro in committing this fallacy. Jacobs Opinion, T1 30.
173. Marschall judgment, 11 31 (emphasis added).
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of opportunity. 17 4 The Marschall judgment left the ambiguity hang-
ing without further comment.
Having thus skirted Kalanke's objection to the preference's pur-
pose, the only question was one of means. Here, the Court focused on
the saving clause as embodying a decisive difference from Kalanke's
"automatic" preference. The Court did not explore what additional
criteria could warrant invoking the savings clause, but noted only
that the Land chose "a legally imprecise expression in order to ensure
flexibility. 1 7 5 The Court accepted this approach, although it re-
quired that "the candidates [be] the subject of an objective assess-
ment [that] take[s] account of all criteria specific to the individual
candidates" and also stipulated that "such criteria are not such as to
discriminate against female candidates. 1 76
Formally, the Marschall opinion continued to label Article 2(4) as
a derogation, which would imply a strict interpretation. 1 77 However,
the judgment appeared anything but strict. The Court relied on two
crucial assumptions, one explicit (women tend to be discriminated
against even where equally qualified) and one implicit (under-
representation is an indicator of prejudice). Its willingness to sanc-
tion a derogation from equal treatment under Article 2(4) on the
basis of such unexamined assumptions contrasts with its rejection of
similar generalizations in Article 2(3) cases as based on impermissi-
ble stereotypes. Moreover, the Court's acceptance of a savings clause
whose meaning was deliberately imprecise seemed at odds with its
emphasis on transparency in Article 2(2) cases. 178
The apparent relaxation of the Court's affirmative action scru-
tiny in Marschall did not pass unnoticed. In the ensuing Badeck
case, 17 9 Advocate General Saggio concluded that a strict interpreta-
tion of Article 2(4) was no longer justified. °8 0 Saggio further argued
174. Tesauro, 1 18, 28.
175. Marschall judgment, 91 5.
176. Id. at 35. This last condition presumably responded to the concern raised by
Advocate General Jacobs that allowing open-ended criteria to be taken into account at
this stage could reintroduce the very same discriminatory attitudes that the prefer-
ence was designed to overcome. See Jacobs Opinion, 91 36 n.39.
177. Marschall judgment, 91 32.
178. The ECJ's stipulation that the candidates be subjected to an "objective" as-
sessment that takes into account criteria specific to the individual candidates hardly
resolves the problem because the Court gives no indication what such criteria might
be, other than the vague proviso that they not "discriminate against the female
candidates."
179. Badeck v. Hessischer Ministerpraesident, Case 158/97, 2000 ECR 1875, 1923,
91 38.
180. Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, Case 158/97, June 10, 1999, 2000 ECR at
1887-88, 91 26. Saggio revived Advocate General Darmon's argument in Hofmann
that Article 2(4) measures complement the formal equality and help to perfect it, and
thus cannot be considered "in the nature of [an] exception [that] must therefore be
interpreted strictly. Id. Saggio noted that the Amsterdam Treaty had specifically
amended Article 119 to encourage affirmative action. Id.
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that, contrary to Advocate General Tesauro's view, Article 2(4) mea-
sures should not be restricted merely to starting points.18 ' Nonethe-
less, Tesauro's starting point/endpoint distinction remained
prominent in both Saggio and the Court's Badeck analysis.
In addition to upholding a direct, but flexible hiring preference
similar that endorsed in Marschall,18 2 the Court approved a variety
of auxiliary measures designed to improve the ability of women to
compete for civil service posts. These included a set-aside for women
of at least half the places in occupational training for jobs in which
women were underrepresented and a similar quota on interview
slots. The ECJ justified these measures as designed to equalize
starting points, not results. The Court emphasized that "[it is not
places in employment which are reserved for women but places in
training with a view to obtaining qualifications with the prospect of
subsequent access to trained occupations in the public service. ''18 3
Likewise, the interview provision did not seek to "achieve a final re-
sult-appointment or promotion-but [to] afford women who are
qualified additional opportunities."1 8 4
Despite the ECJ's disclaimer that these quotas did not "necessa-
rily entail total inflexibility,"18 5 their allocation of placements was
governed by sex and numbers, as opposed to individual criteria, to a
greater extent than in Kalanke.186 The difference for the Court was
clearly the starting point/endpoint distinction. The ECJ was pre-
pared to tolerate stricter quotas for preferences deemed to involve
starting point than it had in Kalanke and Marschall in a contest over
outcomes.
As in Marschall, the Court of Justice never really questioned the
purpose or necessity of these quotas. It referred generally to findings
by the Hesse legislature that "in social reality women continue to be
disadvantaged and that... 'in particular in employment, women do
not have equal access to qualified ... positions."'187 Yet, the Court
did not investigate the extent to which increased access to training
and interviews will remedy such disadvantage.188 Having estab-
181. Id. at points 27-28 (arguing that such a limitation "would enormously reduce
the scope of [affirmative] action, depriving it of substance" and effectiveness).
182. The Badeck preference rule differed slightly in that it imposed a "binding tar-
get" of gender integration to be met within a proscribed time, which arguably pro-
vided an added incentive for administrators to favor women candidates. Id. at 1 14.
183. Badeck judgment, 52.
184. Id. at 60.
185. Id. at 51.
186. Indeed, the Hesse legislature itself referred to the measures as a "strict result
quota." Id. at I 50.
187. Badeck judgment, 49
188. There was no evidence that access to training and interviews were bottlenecks
halting the advancement of women, nor that women were being unfairly excluded.
The Court simply accepted that the measures chosen had the potential to benefit wo-
men and never inquired as to the merits of alternatives.
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lished a general need for affirmative action, the Court deferred to the
legislature to select appropriate measures.
Even looser scrutiny applied to a requirement of equal represen-
tation of women on administrative and supervisory bodies. The
Court presented this quota as flexible, explaining that it was "not
compulsory" and permitted "to some extent, other criteria to be taken
into account."18 9 In upholding the quota on this basis, the Court
went against its Advocate General, who viewed the quota as strict. 190
Its reliance on the "non-compulsory" nature of the quotas ignored the
de facto consequences of such a rule.19 ' Moreover, nowhere did the
Court inquire why such a quota was needed. Getting women ap-
pointed to such committees might be justified as a means to equalize
starting points for female employees by breaking up old boys clubs
and facilitating the adoption of family-friendly policies (although the
judgment did not say so). Even so, was it necessary to enforce strict
parity?
Although the Badeck judgment continued the relaxed scrutiny
seen in Marschall, it did not adopt Saggio's call to formally revoke the
strict interpretation of Article 2(4) established in Kalanke. The ensu-
ing case, Abrahamsson,9 2 decided three months later, perhaps
showed why. The case concerned yet another hiring preference for
women which, unlike those at stake in earlier cases, would permit
even slightly less qualified women to be chosen over men where wo-
men were underrepresented.
The Court began its analysis on a well-worn path. It noted that
the selection went "automatically" to the candidate from the under-
represented sex, "subject only to the proviso that the difference be-
tween the merits of the candidates of each sex is not so great as to
result in a breach of the requirements of objectivity in making ap-
pointments."193 "The scope and effect of that condition," said the
Court, "cannot be precisely determined .... Moreover, candidates are
not subjected to an objective assessment taking account of the specific
personal situations of all the candidates."1 9 4 Therefore, the Court
held the preference impermissible under Article 2(4).195
189. Id. at 65.
190. Saggio Badeck Opinion, 42 (characterizing the quota as impermissibly
rigid).
191. Contrast Commission v. United Kingdom 1983 ECR 3431, IT 9-11 (observing
that such formal commitments "even if they are not legally binding ... have impor-
tant de facto consequences for the employment relationships . . . in so far as they
determine the rights of the workers [which], in the interests of industrial harmony,
undertakings [must] satisfy").
192. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Anderson, 2000 ECR 5539, 5582-3, 52-53.
193. Id. at $1 51-52.
194. Id. at 53.
195. The ECJ then considered whether the provision might be justified under Arti-
cle 141(4) of the E.C. Treaty, a provision inserted at Amsterdam in response to
Kalanke. Here, the Court held only that the preference was "on any view... dispro-
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On its face, the Court's rejection of a preference that was auto-
matic and not subject to an objective assessment of individuals
seemed nothing more than a restatement of Marschall. Yet, its em-
phasis on "clear and unambiguous" selection criteria represented a
tightening of the standard. Indeed, the Court stated explicitly that
such criteria "must be transparent and amenable to review in order
to obviate any arbitrary assessment of the qualifications of candi-
dates.1 96 It seems doubtful that the deliberately vague "savings
clause" in Marschall would have met this standard.
The Court's failure to address squarely the issue of awarding
preference to less qualified candidates-the distinguishing feature of
the Abrahamsson preference-is puzzling. The Court was clearly
troubled by the fact that "selection . . . is ultimately based on the
mere fact of belonging to the under-represented sex . . .even if the
merits of the candidate so selected are inferior.1 97 Unlike Advocate
General Saggio, 198 the Court did not directly condemn this practice,
perhaps reflecting a lack of consensus among the judges. Yet, the
critical tone of the Court's reference to "selection ... based on the
mere fact of belonging to the under-represented sex" underscored the
Court of Justice's limited tolerance for gender preferences that go to
outcomes. Thus, it seems that ECJ has moved toward a two-level
approach to Article 2(4) derogations, whereby measures that fall
within Tesauro's starting point paradigm are treated more indul-
gently than those deemed to aim at results.
This distinction was maintained in Lommers, where the ECJ ap-
proved subsidized child-care for female employees as aimed at start-
ing points, not results.199 The Court held that the "primary object
and effect of such a measure . . . is to facilitate" employment by par-
ents and noted that a lack of
suitable and affordable nursery facilities is like to induce
more particularly female employees to give up their jobs...
That being so, [subsidized child-care] forms part of the re-
stricted concept of equality of opportunity in so far as it is
not places of employment which are reserved for women but
portionate to the aim pursued." Id. at 55. The Court's reluctance to give more sub-
stance to Article 141(4) may have reflected an element of judicial pique toward a
provision originally intended to reverse its Kalanke judgment.
196. Abrahamsson judgment, at 5582, 49-50.
197. Id. at 53.
198. See Opinion of Advocate General Saggio, in Case 407/98, Abrahamsson v. An-
derson, November 16, 1999, 28 (protesting that preferring less qualified candidates
would "give rise to a system according absolute and unconditional priority and conse-
quently reserving posts for women").
199. Case 476/99, Lommers v. Minister van Landouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij,
Judgment of March 19, 2002, 38.
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enjoyment of certain working conditions designed to facili-
tate their ... career."200
In upholding the scheme, the ECJ appeared to contradict its
prior judgment in Commission v. France, which had rejected similar
child-care subsidies under both Articles 2(3) and 2(4).201 The Court
distinguished the Article 2(4) analysis in the prior case on the ground
that France had not offered a specific rationale to justify such subsi-
dies, which had been lumped into a set of undifferentiated "special
rights" for women. Yet, many of the other provisions would also seem
to conform to the Court's starting points paradigm. 20 2 The suspicion
thus remains that the different outcome in Lommers reflected the
ECJ's more receptive attitude to affirmative action post-Marschall.
An even clearer contrast may be drawn between Lommers and
Commission v. France with respect to the Article 2(3) analysis in the
latter. Had the Court applied the logic of Article 2(3) to Lommers, the
recognition of gender differences in parental roles would have been
rejected as an impermissible stereotype. The Lommers Court took a
step in this direction when it noted that "[t]he situations of a male
employee and female employee, respectively father and mother of
young children, are comparable as regards the possible need for them
to use nursery facilities." It would follow under an Article 2(3) ap-
proach that fathers could also benefit from, and should be eligible for
subsidies. 20 3
Yet, the Court does not say this. Rather it recognizes the prevail-
ing social reality that it is mothers, not fathers who are liable to bear
the primary burden of child-care and are thus "more particularly" in
need of aid-precisely the sort of recognition of de facto gender roles
it has ruled out under Article 2(3). Furthermore, in accepting that
Article 2(4) measures can target broader societal inequalities only in-
directly connected to employment, the Court opens the door to a
much wider range of affirmative action. Unlike Marschall, where the
preference was justified as counteracting discrimination in the work-
200. Id. at 29, 37-38. The Court drew an analogy to the reservation of training
places in Badeck, although the Lommers set-aside went further in scope in that 100%
of the places were reserved for women, instead of merely half. Id. at 33.
201. The Court also implicitly rejected AG Slynn's view that Article 2(4) could not
justify privileges "never enjoyed by men." The child-care program in Lommers had
been specifically created to benefit female employees. Id. at 9.
202. These provisions included, inter alia, "time off for sick children, extra days'
holiday each year per child, [and] a day off on the first day of the school term," all of
which could arguably help working mothers to reconcile parenting with continued
employment in a similar manner. Comm. v. France, 1988 ECR at 6327. Indeed, the
originator of the starting point paradigm, Advocate General Tesauro, writing in
Kalanke, had felt that the Court had taken an overly harsh view of these measures in
Commission v. France. See Tesauro opinion in Kalanke, 1995 ECR at 3063, % 18.
203. Cf. Comm. v. France, judgment, 1988 ECR at 6336 (rejecting parenting rights
reserved for women).
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place, in Lommers, the reservation of subsidized child-care to female
employees is justified as a remedy to inequalities in parenting.
Perhaps conscious of the need to counterbalance this expansion
of rationales, the ECJ emphasized-where Badeck had not-that
even affirmative action aimed at starting points remained subject to
proportionality control.20 4 The Court then explained that extending
the childcare benefit to male employees was impractical since "insuf-
ficiency of supply" meant that there were not enough subsidized
places even for female employees. 20 5 Yet, as Advocate General Slynn
pointed out in Commission v. France, a lack of resources is no excuse.
"Practical difficulties ... cannot permit a member-state unilaterally
to opt out of fulfilling its obligations" to implement gender equal-
ity."20 6 Nor did the Court's observation that male employees could
purchase child-care elsewhere offer much consolation since such
placements would have to be purchased at market cost.20 7 Viewed in
this light, instead of being merely a means to an end, such subsidies
could be seen as an employment perk in their own right, making their
allocation resemble more outcome than starting points.
The Court's proportionality analysis did lead it to impose one
substantive restriction. It noted assurances offered during the pro-
ceedings that single fathers would have access to the subsidized
placements on the same basis as women and warned that without
such a provision the women-only policy would "interfer[e] excessively
with the individual right to equal treatment."208 In other words, the
Court made its approval conditional on a sort of savings clause to
prevent gender preferences from losing track of individual need.
Just as Abrahamsson tightened the standard from Marschall by
requiring "clear and unambiguous" criteria "amenable to review,"
Lommers may be seen as tightening up Badeck by invoking propor-
tionality controls even for preferences deemed to aim at starting
points. Yet, the scrutiny that the Court actually applies remains rel-
atively light. Instead of getting stricter over time, the ECJ's Article
2(4) jurisprudence has thus taken a more erratic course than that
seen in the other derogations from equal treatment. In some ways,
Kalanke still represents the high water mark of affirmative action
scrutiny. There was a strong grain of individualism running through
Advocate General Tesauro's Kalanke opinion (which the Court
seemed to adopt), opposing a "collective vision of equality" in which
individual rights are sacrificed to compensate a disadvantaged
204. Lommers judgment, 39.
205. Id. at $ 42-43.
206. Slynn opinion, 1988 ECR at 3572; See also Case 243/95, Hill and Stapleton v.
Revenue Comm'r, 1998 ECR 3739, 3769, 39-40 (increased cost of compliance can-
not alone justify discrimination).
207. Lommers judgment, 44.
208. Id. at $ 47.
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group.20 9 Women could not be preferred "simply because they are
women."2 10 By contrast, under Marschall, such preferences were
permitted, so long as individual criteria were not entirely effaced.2 11
The resurgence of individualist rhetoric in Abrahamsson, which
again criticized preferences based on "the mere fact of belonging to
the under-represented sex" is consistent with that judgments' more
assertive judicial review.2 12 Similarly, in Lommers, the ECJ pointed
to the flip side of the individualist coin: the danger that affirmative
action will "perpetuate a traditional division of roles between men
and women."2 13
One might quibble that such concerns are misplaced in a case
concerning childcare intended to help women break free from their
traditional caregiver role. Indeed, this transformational aim of Arti-
cle 2(4) may explain the Court's relative indifference to justifications
based on generalizations. The concern that gender-specific measures
might rest upon, and in turn legitimize, gender stereotypes seems
less acute than in Article 2(2) and 2(3) cases. Yet, some forms of af-
firmative action can give rise to harmful stereotypes: e.g., a belief
that beneficiaries of preferential treatment are unqualified. 2 14
The nature of judicial review in Article 2(4) cases has changed in
more than just rhetorical tone. In Kalanke and (possibly) Commis-
sion v. France, the Court of Justice began with a fairly robust pur-
pose-scrutiny reminiscent of Article 2(3), rejecting in each case
preferential treatment deemed incompatible with Article 2(4)'s in-
tent. Perhaps due to the controversy Kalanke generated, the Court
retreated in Marschall to the scrutiny of means, as in Article 2(2).215
There is, however, a difference. In Article 2(2) cases, the ECJ has
emphasized the second prong of the proportionality test, necessity.
Where it has rejected sex qualifications, it has done so on the ground
that they are unnecessarily broad in light of the stated aim.2 16
209. Tesauro Opinion, 1995 ECR at 3057, T 7-8.
210. Id. at 1I 22. Such individualist rhetoric is echoed in Advocate General Jacobs
subsequent Marschall opinion. See Jacobs Opinion, 1997 ECR at 6374, 31-32 (de-
crying appointment based "solely by virtue of [candidate's] sex." ).
211. See More, "Case Note on Marschall," 36 Comm. Mkt. L. Rev. 443, 450-51
(1999) (describing Marschall as compromise between individual and group rights).
212. See Abrahamsson judgment, 2000 ECR at 5582, 53.
213. Lommers judgment, 41.
214. See Krieger, "Civil Rights Perestoika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative
Action," 86 Cal. L. Rev. 1251, 1264-70 (1998).
215. See Jean-Guy, "Les Discriminations Indirectes et les Discriminations Posi-
tive," in Gabrielle Vonfeldt (ed.), L'Egalite de Traitment entre Hommes et Femmes 54-
55 (2000) (describing the shift made in Marschall).
216. Thus, in Commission v. UK, the Court found that not all household employ-
ment was of a gender-sensitive nature; in Commission v. France, it found that not all
police work involved dealing with violence; and in Kreil, it seems to have considered
the exclusion of women from the Bundeswehr just plain overbroad. The only excep-
tion is Johnston, which emphasized minimizing burdens, possibly because the Court
knew that its necessity analysis stood on infirm ground.
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By contrast, Article 2(4) cases from Kalanke onward have fo-
cused on the third prong of proportionality, whether undue burdens
are imposed on others, a concern generally ignored in Article 2(2). As
Advocate General Saggio explained in Badeck, inserting a "savings
clause" to temper the automatic priority given to women "allows
other candidates to be considered and lessens the discriminatory ef-
fect of that requirement on those candidates. '217 Hence, running
through the Court's cases is a basic dichotomy contrasting flexible
preferences (good) with automatic (bad).
The starting point/result distinction supplies the other axis of
the ECJ's affirmative action review. Given that starting points typi-
cally involve nonzero-sum contexts, their status as the preferred ter-
rain for Article 2(4) remedies is consistent with an emphasis on
minimizing burdens on non-beneficiaries. After Lommers, both start-
ing points and results appear subject to proportionality, however, so
the distinction in the Court's review has to some extent blurred.
More fundamentally, as Lommers shows, it is not always easy to say
which is which. In conditions of scarcity, almost any benefit granted
to women, but not men, can be characterized as a result. For this
reason, the starting pointoutcome distinction has been criticized as
analytically thin and misleading. 218
Missing from this analytic framework is any notion of necessity.
In Marschall, Advocate General Jacobs argued that "a gender-specific
measure will not . . .be proportionate if the same result could be
achieved by a gender-neutral provision."219 In Lommers, the Court
itself seemed almost ready to contemplate such a standard.220 Yet,
the social disadvantage that affirmative action targets is such an
amorphous phenomenon that appraisals of instrumental necessity
are hard to carry out. Unlike pregnancy in Article 2(3), the rationales
for affirmative action are not confined to a single core objective. Nor
can their context be defined with precision as with Article 2(2); after
Lommers, the locus of potential inequality extends to home life as
well as the office. Judicial review of Article 2(4) remedies must there-
fore tolerate a degree of ambiguity and generalization that would be
unacceptable under Article 2(2) or 2(3). The Court's emphasis on
minimizing burdens does not so much solve the problem as change
the subject.
Curiously, in each of the last five Article 2(4) cases decided was a
criterion that provided, at least prima facie, some indication of neces-
sity: underrepresentation of women in the relevant workforce. The
217. AG Saggio's Badeck opinion, 2000 ECR 1891 ECR, 31.
218. See, e.g., Williams, "The Idea of Equality," Problems of the Self (1973).
219. AG Jacobs, 1997 ECR 6377-78, T 43. This resembles the "no lesser alterna-
tive" test applied in free movement cases.
220. Lommers judgment, 42.
2003]
HeinOnline -- 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 589 2003
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
ECJ has rarely commented on this facet of the cases.221 Its Advocate
Generals have been only slightly less reticent. In Kalanke, Tesauro
acknowledged that under-representation could be an indicator of dis-
advantage, but then downplayed its significance. 222 In Badeck, Sag-
gio suggested that de minimis underrepresentation would fail the
test of necessity .223 The reverse may also be true: Greater neces-
sity-severe gender imbalance, particularly where resistant to prior
remediation-should justify stronger preferential measures. Such
circumstances were alleged in Abrahamsson; yet, the Court's analysis
made no allowance for such details.224
Ultimately, of course, underrepresentation can tell but half the
story; it can locate a problem, but not the cure. Only by inquiring
into the causes of gender imbalance can an appropriate set of reme-
dies can be identified and evaluated-a contextual question arguably
better suited to the national judiciaries. 225 As the ECJ continues to
tighten its review of affirmative action after Lommers, hopefully it
will move to prescribe a more robust form of necessity scrutiny along
these lines.
III. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
The universe of facially-neutral norms having differing effects on
men than women encompasses a much broader spectrum than the
gender-specific norms caught by the prohibition on direct discrimina-
tion. This makes indirect discrimination scrutiny a potentially pow-
erful tool to root out hidden structural biases that hold women
back.22 6 At the same time, the scope for justification of such dispa-
rate impacts is much broader as it is no longer restricted to defined
derogations. Therefore, the bite of indirect discrimination scrutiny
depends in large part on what sort of justifications are permissible. 227
Instead of progressively interpreting a limited set of derogations, the
Court must therefore make a series of ad hoc judgments that balance
221. Only Lommers placed any emphasis on gender imbalance as a justifying fac-
tor. See Lommers judgment, 36, 50.
222. See Tesauro,1995 ECR at 3066, 24 (arguing that underrepresentation does
not necessarily prove discrimination).
223. See Saggio opinion, 2000 ECR at 1891, 32.
224. See Abrahamsson judgment, 2000 ECR 5570, 13 (slow progress towards
gender parity deemed to justify "an extraordinary effort .. .to ensure, in the short
term, a significant increase in the number of female professors");.
225. See Pager, "Strictness and Subsidiarity: An Institutional View of Affirmative
Action at the European Court of Justice," 26 B.C. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 35, 65-70 (forth-
coming 2003).
226. Feminists thus view such scrutiny as essential to a "substantive equality" ap-
proach. See, e.g., More, "'Equal Treatment' of the Sexes in European Community
Law: What Does 'Equal' Mean?," 1 Fern. Leg. Stud. 45, 64-71 (1993).
227. See Evelyn Ellis, Sex Discrimination Law (2d ed., 1998).
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competing priorities. 228 Perhaps for this reason, the Court has often
preferred to defer to national courts to assess justification, as they
are more likely to be familiar with the facts of the particular case.
When the ECJ has intervened, it has generally done so at the level of
purpose, vetting justifications a priori, while leaving proportionality
to be assessed by the national court.
Since most of the European Court of Justice's indirect discrimi-
nation cases have involved unfavorable treatment of part-time work-
ers among whose ranks women predominate, 2 29 part-time status
functions as a proxy for women. As the Court's scrutiny has tight-
ened, it has exposed generalizations about this category of workers
that are often thinly-veiled stereotypes. Despite the focus of indirect
review on ostensibly gender-neutral norms, stricter scrutiny in such
cases has therefore served to uproot discriminatory attitudes in much
the same way as direct review.
A. Towards Strictness
The ECJ's indirect gender discrimination jurisprudence began
with Bilka,2 30 a case in which the exclusion of part-time workers
from the company's occupational pension scheme was alleged to dis-
criminate against female employees, since part-timers were mostly
women. The company justified the exclusion "as intended solely to
discourage part-time work." It explained that "in general part-time
workers refuse to work in the late afternoon and on Saturdays ... to
ensure the presence of an adequate workforce during those periods, it
was therefore necessary to make full-time work more attractive than
part-time" by restricting the pension scheme to full-time
employees. 23 1
The Court subjected this defense to a fairly stiffly-worded propor-
tionality test. To justify the discriminatory impact, "the measures
chosen by Bilka [had to] correspond to a real need on the part of the
undertaking, [be] appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives
pursued and [be] necessary to that end." The exclusion would appear
disproportionate on its face. The company's declared interest in ob-
taining late-afternoon and weekend workers could have been ad-
dressed more directly through other (non-discriminatory) incentives.
228. As Sacha Prechal has explained, "the objective pursued... must take priority
over the principle of equal treatment (i.e., must be sufficiently important). This test
implies in fact that a balancing of interests must be made." Prechal, "Combatting
Indirect Discrimination in the Community Law Context," 1993 Leg. Issues of Eur.
Integ. 81, 87.
229. See Opinion of AG Warner, Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate Ltd., 1981 ECR
911, 930 (giving Community statistics).
230. Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 ECR 1607. An
earlier case, Jenkins, had confused matter by suggesting that proof of discriminatory
intent might be required. See Jenkins, 1981 ECR 911, 926, $ 14.
231. Bilka judgment, 1986 ECR at 1627-28, 33.
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Moreover, the exclusion was overbroad in that it penalized all part-
time employees for the preferences of a few. Yet, having framed the
test, the Court of Justice deferred without comment to the national
court to perform the analysis. 2 3
2
The ECJ continued its hands-off approach in Kowalska,233 an-
other case involving part-time employees, this time excluded from a
severance grant upon termination. The stated justification-that
part-timers were less likely to have dependants to support-relied on
a generalization that would itself be deemed discriminatory under
the analysis applied in the Court's Article 2(3) case law. 23 4 Yet, once
again, the Court deferred without comment to the national court to
determine whether the discriminatory impact of the exclusion could
be justified.235
In Rummler,236 the ECJ took a small step toward stricter review
(and more active supervision at the European level). The case consid-
ered whether "muscle demand" could be used as a criterion to deter-
mine pay, even though this would "tend to favour male workers [who]
in general... are physically stronger."237 The Court held that use of
such a criterion was permissible, if objectively justified by the nature
of the work. It noted that a contrary rule would have the perverse
effect of making women higher-cost employees, encouraging discrimi-
nation. The Court did stipulate, however, that the job classification
system must be considered as a whole and that it must "be estab-
lished . . . if the nature of the tasks in question so permits [that] re-
gard is had to other criteria in relation to which women workers may
have a particular aptitude."238
Danfoss239 showed some further signs of tighter judicial scrutiny.
Because the pay criteria used by the employer was "so completely
lacking in transparency [that] female employees [could not] establish
different[ial]" treatment in individual cases, the Court reversed the
burden of proof, placing the onus of the employer to prove an absence
of discrimination, citing precedent from its Article 2(2) cases. 240
232. Id. at 1 36.
233. Case 33/89, Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1990 ECR 2591.
234. Cf. Comm'n v. France, 1998 ECR at 6336, 14 (rejecting benefits premised on
traditional notion of female caregiver).
235. 1990 ECR at 2611-12; See Arnull, supra n. 104, at 489 (criticizing ECJ for
failing to challenge "implausible" generalization in Kowalska); Ellis, supra n. 10, at
130 (same).
236. Case 61/81, Rummler v. Dato-Druck GmbH, 1982 ECR 2601.
237. Rummler, judgment, 8, 15. The plaintiff had sought to have pay based on
effort exerted, a standard which would permit women to be paid more for lifting the
same amount. Id. at IT1 4, 18.
238. Id. at 15. The Court did not offer examples of such "female" criteria, nor
elaborate on how to identify them.
239. Case 109/88, Handels-OG Kontorfunktion Aerernes Forbund i Danmark v.
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, ex parte Danfoss A/S, 1989 ECR 3199.
240. Id. at 3225, 12 (citing in re French Civ. Serv., the French police case; empha-
sis added).
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Transparency was also invoked in Enderby where the Court of Jus-
tice held that pay disparities could not be justified on the mere
ground that the pay for different groups been set been by separate
collective bargaining, given the nontransparent nature of such
processes. 241 Instead, it required that justification be based on "ob-
jective criteria," such as "market forces." 242
Danfoss, too, pushed for objectivity in pay criteria. Taking an-
other device from its Article 2(2) tool kit, the ECJ restricted consider-
ation of employee training and "mobility" (adaptability to variable
hours and places of work), requiring employers to show that such cri-
teria were "of importance for the performance of specific tasks en-
trusted to the employee."243 Moreover, the Court flatly rejected
"quality of work" as a pay criterion where "it systematically works to
the disadvantage of women [since it is inconceivable that the quality
of work done by women should generally be less good." 244
The European Court loosened its grip a notch, however, when it
held that length of service could be rewarded "without having to es-
tablish the importance it has in the performance of specific tasks."
The Court justified this ruling on the ground that "length of service
goes hand in hand with experience and ... experience generally en-
ables the employee to perform his duties better."245 Acceptance of
such generalizations without further scrutiny seems incongruous
with the Court's other holdings. Indeed, even in Kowalska, the
Court's tolerance of a stereotype had been at least mitigated by the
promise of further scrutiny by the national court.
Strictness returned with new vigor in Rinner-Kihn,246 a case
where sick pay had been denied to employees working less than ten
hours weekly on the ground that such staff were "not as integrated"
into the workforce. 247 The Court refused to accept this claim because
it rested on unproven generalizations. 248 Rinner-Kiihn was in turn
cited in Nimz, where the Court reversed its position on seniority,
holding that the link between seniority and performance needed to be
established in each case based on "the relationship between the na-
241. Case 127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth., 1993 ECR 5535, 5574, 22-
23.
242. Id. at 1275, 11 25-27; but see Case 400/93, Specialarbejderforbundfet i
Danmark v. Dansk Industrie, ex parte Royal Copenhagen, 1995 ECR 1275, 1317
(holding that collective bargaining could still be considered as a relevant factor).
243. Id. at 3228, 23 (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 20. The Court felt that such outcomes could "only be because the
employer has misapplied" the criterion. Id.
245. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
246. Case 17188, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezialgebaudereinigung GmbH Y& Co,
1989 ECR 2743.
247. Id. at 2761, 13. As usual, the ranks of ineligible part-timers were predomi-
nantly female. Id. at 2759, 5.
248. Id. at 2761, 14. The Court did allow the possibility for further justification
upon remand.
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ture of the work performed and the experience gained" over time.24 9
More broadly, it stated explicitly that "generalisations about certain
categories of workers" could not justify measures having discrimina-
tory impact.250
A strict line was also taken in Ruzius-Wilbrink, where the Court
refused to allow lower disability benefits granted to part-time work-
ers to be justified under an alleged policy of preventing benefits from
exceeding prior income because the Dutch government had made ex-
ceptions to the policy in other areas (i.e. the rule of consistency-
often invoked in free movement cases-had not satisfied).251
B. Discretion Revived
In these cases, one can see the Court of Justice gradually aban-
doning the largely passive role that it had played in early cases to
move toward more vigorous scrutiny. Up to this point, the ECJ made
little distinction between the type of norm under review. Most of
these cases involved discrimination within the context of a specific
employment relationship. However, Rinner-Kiihn and Ruzius-Wil-
brink dealt with statutory welfare provisions that applied to all work-
ers in the Member State. Advocate General Darmon had argued in
both cases that where a "legislative," as opposed to a "contractual"
provision was at stake, the burden should remain on the plaintiff to
prove that the discrimination was not justified.
There is a difference in nature between an employer for
whom pay policy is one of the most important parts of his
business strategy and the legislature, the trustee of the pub-
lic interest, which must take account of a very large number
of social, economic and political factors, of which the ratio
between male and female workers is just one aspect. Conse-
quently, although it may be legitimately presumed.., that a
wage measure adopted by [an employer] is unlawful, the
same does not apply to a national legislature.252
Darmon's argument was not adopted by the Court in either judg-
ment. Accordingly, Darmon tried a different tack in Commission v.
Belgium, citing Hofmann for the proposition that Member States "en-
joy a reasonable margin of discretion" in social policy. 25 3 By this
point, the ECJ had largely abandoned Hofmann's erstwhile deference
249. Case 184/89, Nimz v. Freie Und Hansestadt Hamburg, 1991 ECR 297, 319,
14.
250. Id.
251. Case 102/88, Ruzius-Wilbrink v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor
Overheidsdienster, 1989 ECR 4311.
252. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, in Ruzius, 1989 ECR at 4324-25; in
Rinner-Kiihn, 1989 ECR at 2753-54.
253. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Case 229/89, Commission v. Belgium,
1991 ECR 2205, 2220, points 20-22.
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to social policy in Article 2(3) cases. However, the Court endorsed
such an approach in Commission v. Belgium, echoing Darmon that
"in the current state of Community law[, social policy] is a matter for
the Member States which enjoy a reasonable margin of discretion as
regards both the nature of the protective measures and the detailed
arrangements for their implementation." 254 The Court then held
that Belgium had shown that its system of benefits was suitable and
necessary to achieve its social policy and was therefore justified.
The phrasing of this conclusion indicated that the burden had
remained on Belgium to prove justification, notwithstanding its mar-
gin of discretion. Nonetheless, the Court seemed to have lowered the
barrier that Member States had to meet. This was confirmed in the
ensuing Molenbroek case, 25 5 where the Court approved a system of
pension supplements designed to guarantee pensioners with a
younger dependant spouse a minimum income; a scheme for which
many more men than women qualified.256 The Court accepted that
the supplements served a legitimate social policy aim as to which the
Netherlands enjoyed a margin of discretion.257 The Court then held
the fact that at times the supplement is granted to persons
who, having regard to the income which they receive from
other sources, do not need it in order to guarantee a mini-
mum level of subsistence cannot affect the fact that the
means chosen are necessary having regard to the aim.2 58
This holding bordered on the tautological. The Court failed to
explain how something could be "necessary" when it is not "need [ed]."
In fact, the only reason for tolerating the overpayments would seem
to be administrative convenience. 25 9 The Court's failure to question
the necessity of the payment system bespoke the reemergence of its
formerly indulgent approach to social policy.
This weakened understanding of necessity was made explicit in
Nolte,260 where the Court accepted the exclusion of employees work-
ing less than 15 hours a week from statutory old-age insurance based
on Germany's claim that the insurance scheme could not accommo-
date such employees and that any attempt to do so would sacrifice
254. 1991 ECR at 2229.
255. Case 226/91, Molenbroek v. Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, 1992
ECR 5943.
256. The supplements were alleged discriminatory because many more men than
women qualified for them. Id. at 12.
257. Id. at 5968, TT 14-15.
258. Id. at 5969, TT 17-18 (emphasis added).
259. See Ellis, EC Sex Equality, supra n. 227, at 301 (agreeing that Court passes
over the necessity issue).
260. Case 317/93, Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, 95 ECR 4625;
See also Case 444/93, Megner & Sheffel v. Innungskrankenkasse Vorderplatz, 1995
ECR 4741 (decided contemporaneously).
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jobs or foster a black market in "minor employment."261 The Court
made no attempt to subject these claims to independent scrutiny, but
simply held that that in exercising its discretion to pursue its "social
... policy aim... the [German] legislature was reasonably entitled to
consider that the legislation in question was necessary."262
Not only did the Court thus apply a lower standard of necessity,
but it broke its usual practice of deferring to national courts to assess
justification. In fact, Germany's conclusory assertions seemed hardly
self-evident, let alone proportionate. Advocate General Leger, for
one, expressed doubt as to whether the exclusion was justified (al-
though he would have deferred to the national court).263 He also
noted that several Member States did not impose such restrictions on
participation in comparable schemes, and that among those that did,
Germany imposed the highest threshold, leaving almost 15% of the
workforce excluded (thus inviting the Court to rule against Germany
as an outlier ).264
In subsequent social security cases, the Court has continued to
apply this "reasonableness" standard in assessing the necessity of so-
cial policies enacted by the Member States, and, in each case, has
concluded itself that the Member State had met the standard.265 Al-
though such deferential review falls short of the reversal of presump-
tion originally sought by Advocate General Darmon, it comes close.
This deference regarding the choice of means has not, however,
stopped the Court from intervening on matters of principle where it
deems necessary to ensure effective judicial review. 266
Yet, during roughly the same period, the Court handed down a
trio of judgments that took a strict line concerning compensation for
service on German staff councils, bodies designed to promote labor-
management harmony. German law limited compensation for train-
ing courses attended by employees serving on the councils to the re-
placement of income from lost work-time. In Bbtel,267 decided the
same year as Molenbroek, the Court observed that this limit meant
261. Id. at 4659-60, %% 29, 31-32; Germany's claims were supported by the U.K.
and Ireland. Idat 30.
262. Id. at 4660, 1 34 (emphasis added).
263. See Opinion of AG Leger in Nolte, 1991 ECR 4627, 4647, points 76-78.
264. Id. at 4646, T 75.
265. See Case 8/94, Laperre v. Bestuurscommissie Beroepszaken in de Provincie
Zuid-Holland, 1996 ECR 273, 295-96, 19; Case 280/94, Posthuma-van Damme v.
Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen,
1996 ECR 179, 204-05.
266. Cf., e.g., Comm. v. Belgium, 1991 ECR at 2228, %% 17-18 (discrimination in
welfare benefits cannot be justified merely by pointing to demographic disparities);
De Weerd v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, 1994 ECR at 600,
35 (budgetary considerations cannot in themselves justify sex discrimination).
267. Case 360/90, Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin eV v. BMtel, 1992 ECR 3589.
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that part-time workers were likely to get less compensation than
their full-time colleagues for the same number of hours.268
[S]uch a situation is likely to deter employees in the part-
time category, in which the proportion of women is undenia-
bly preponderant, from serving on staff councils or from ac-
quiring the knowledge needed in order to serve on them,
thus making it more difficult for that category of women to
be represented .... To that extent, the difference in treat-
ment in question cannot be regarded as justified. 269
The Botel judgment provoked intense controversy in Ger-
many.270 Invited explicitly to reconsider its stance in two subsequent
references from German courts, the Court of Justice accepted that
the restriction could, in principle, be justified as part of a German
social policy intended "to place the independence of staff council
members above financial inducements for performing staff council
functions." 271 However, the Court held the restriction subject to the
strict proportionality test of Bilka, not the looser Nolte standard, but
deferred to the national courts to decide the matter. 272 Its judgment
emphasized that the German courts must find a genuine necessity,
having consideration for alternative (less burdensome) means to
achieve the policy aim. This latter requirement-often seen in free
movement cases-set a fairly strict standard. The Court of Justice
also pointedly recalled its holding in Bbtel regarding the deterrent
effect of the compensation limits on the representation of women-a
clear signal of doubt as to whether the policy could pass the test. 27 3
This second round of staff council judgments appeared the year
after Nolte and within weeks of the Court's Laperre decision reaffirm-
ing Nolte's weak standard of necessity and finding that standard met
on the evidence submitted. One might explain the stricter necessity
test set in the staff council cases as a reflection of the ECJ's doubts as
268. This is because part-timers would reach the cap on total compensation sooner
since they had fewer work hours to lose.
269. 1992 ECR at 3613-14. The ECJ did leave the door open for further justifica-
tion before the national court. Id.
270. Prechal, "Combatting Indirect Discrimination in the Community Law Con-
text," 1993 Leg. Issues of Eur. Int. (1993) 81, 93, n.52; Arnull, supra n. 104, at 492.
271. Case 278/93, Freers & Speckmann v. Deutsche Bundespost, 1996 ECR 1165,
1192, 26; Case 457/93, Kuratorium fur Dialyse und Nierentransplantantion v.
Lewark, 1996 ECR 243, 269-70, 35.
272. The two advocate generals had split on the test outcome. AG Darmon, who
had also written the opinion in Botel, would have found the policy disproportionate.
Opinion of AG Darmon, Freers & Speckmann, 1996 ECR at 1178-80; AG Jacobs was
inclined to accept it as justified. Opinion of AG Jacobs in Lewark, 1996 ECR at 257-
58.
273. 1996 ECR 270, 37-38; 1996 ECR 1192-93, I 29-30; Arnull, supra n. 104,
at 493 (describing skeptical tone ofjudgment). Arguably, the Court should have stuck
its ground and invalidated the policy. Given the Court's acceptance that the policy
had a deterrent effect, a justification based on an avowed policy of avoiding induce-
ment rings hollow.
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to justifiability, edged perhaps by a touch of judicial displeasure at
the request for reconsideration. Having chosen to defer to the Ger-
man courts on what was evidentially a matter of national concern,
the Court may have also erred deliberately on the side of strictness to
compensate for possible German bias. Another explanation would be
to ascribe the conflicting approaches to the different chambers of the
Court hearing these cases. 274 Or did the Court of Justice really in-
tend a stricter standard for non-social security policy cases?
Further evidence arrived with the Seymour-Smith judgment.275
At issue was Britain's two-year probation period for new employees
before actions for unfair dismissal could be brought. The UKjustified
the requirement as part of a social policy of encouraging recruitment
by employers who might otherwise be unwilling to risk taking on new
hires. The Court of Justice accepted this as prima facie legitimate. 276
As in the staff council cases, however, the Court stressed the need to
consider "the possibility of achieving the social policy aim in question
by other means, '277 again setting a fairly strict standard of necessity.
Yet, the Court had to reconcile this language with the more lenient
"reasonableness" standard of Nolte relied on by the UK. The ECJ
began by acknowledging the broad margin of discretion recognized in
Nolte, then continued:
However, although social policy is essentially a matter for
the Member States under Community law as it stands, the
fact remains that the broad margin of discretion available to
the Member States in that connection cannot have the effect
of frustrating the implementation of a fundamental principle
of Community law such as that of equal pay for men and
women. Mere generalizations concerning the capacity of a
specific measure to encourage recruitment are not enough to
show that the aim of the disputed rule is unrelated to any
discrimination based on sex nor to provide evidence on the
basis of which it could be reasonably considered that the
means chosen were suitable for achieving that aim.27 8
What to make of this holding? On the one hand, the Court em-
ployed the deferential "reasonableness" language from Nolte. Indeed,
the test could even be seen as weaker than Nolte in that it omitted
mention of necessity entirely and seemed only to require suitability.
Yet, the invocation of fundamental rights served as a signal that the
274. The Botel and subsequent Freers judgments were issued by the Court's Sixth
Chamber, whereas the Nolte line of cases came from either the Court's Second or
Fourth Chambers or the Court en banc.
275. Case 167/97, R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-
Smith, 1999 ECR 623.
276. Id. at 685, IT 70-71.
277. Id. at 72.
278. Id. at 74.
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ECJ wanted to impose a limit on Nolte discretion. Moreover, unlike
Nolte where the Court was content to accept conclusory allegations as
the basis for justification, the Court of Justice now demanded actual
evidence. In assessing such evidence, the national court would pre-
sumably bear in mind the judgment's earlier call to investigate alter-
native solutions. The judgment thus seemed to strike a middle path
between the strict stance taken in the staff council cases and the leni-
ent Nolte test. The somewhat awkward marriage of these conflicting
approaches perhaps reflected indecision within the Court itself.
2 79
The ambiguous nature of Seymour-Smith left open the question
of whether the Court has two approaches to social policy scrutiny-
one for social security, another for other contexts-or only one. The
Court has placed particular emphasis on ensuring the financial sta-
bility of social security schemes in its direct discrimination cases. 280
Judicial deference on the indirect side might therefore be explained
by a reluctance to upset the (nest) egg basket. Yet, the deferential
approach of Nolte and its progeny has been justified all along based
on respect for Member State discretion over social policy generally.
The muddled middle course set in Seymour-Smith could therefore re-
present a unification of the two lines of cases.
Despite the confusion surrounding the Court's standard(s) for so-
cial policy review, it is clear that whatever deference is thus entailed
applies only to public norms, as opposed to private employment
rules. 281 This basic distinction envisioned by Advocate General
Darmon was made plain in Kriiger,28 2 a case that, like Nolte, ad-
dressed the exclusion of employees working less than 15 hour-weeks
from a benefit-in this case, a Christmas bonus. Unlike Nolte, the
exclusion was not statutory in nature, rather but contractual. Advo-
cate General Leger saw no difference between the two cases. 283 In a
rather Grinch-like opinion, he argued that "to include persons in mi-
nor employment ... [in] the Christmas bonus, would radically alter
the very concept of this type of employment."284
The Court, however, took a different approach, observing that:
the main proceedings concern a situation which is different
from those in Nolte .... In this case, it is not a question of
either a measure adopted by the national legislature in the
context of its discretionary power or a basic principle of the
279. See Hepple & Barnard, supra n. 10, at 411 ("judgment [in Seymour-Smith]
reeks of compromise" between judges).
280. See, e.g., Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Richardson, 1995
ECR 3407, 3431; Secretary of State for Soc. Sec. v. Thomas, 1993 ECR 1247, 1272.
The long-term timeframes involved makes this concern particularly salient.
281. See Ellis, supra n. 10, at 1410 (describing three-level "hierarchy of tests for
justification of indirect discrimination").
282. Case 281/97, Krtiger v. Kreiskrankenhaus Ebersberg, 1999 ECR 5127.
283. Opinion of AG Leger, Case 281/97, Kriiger, at 5138-39, 53-55.
284. Id. at 5139, 57.
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German social security system, but of the exclusion of per-
sons in minor employment from the benefit of a collective
agreement which provides for the grant of a special annual
bonus, the result of this being that, in respect of pay, those
persons are treated differently from [other employees].... In
the light of the foregoing ... exclusion [from the] bonus
constitutes indirect discrimination. 28 5
This 180-degree reversal in outcome from Nolte, whereby a pri-
vate norm was subjected to more rigorous equality enforcement than
Nolte's treatment of its public equivalent mirrors a similar public/pri-
vate split in other gender equality cases dealing with affirmative obli-
gations under Article 2(3), where private actors are once again held
to a higher standard. Thus, in Gillespie, the Court declined to re-
quire women on maternity leave to be paid full salary, treating this
as a question of social policy for Member States28 6 ; yet, the Court
insisted that the same women receive, in full and retroactively, a pay
raise from their employer awarded during their absence. 2 7 Simi-
larly, in Thibault, the Court contrasted the discretion that Member
States have "as to the social measures they adopt in" implementing
Article 2(3), with "treatment of a woman regarding her working con-
ditions" during maternity, a private employment question as to which
equal treatment was to be strictly enforced. 288
The Court of Justice has continued to demonstrate vigorous scru-
tiny of indirect discrimination in other "private" employment cases.
In Hill & Stapleton, the ECJ reviewed a employee pay system that
penalized workers converting from job sharing position to full-time
285. Kruger judgment, 1999 ECR at 5149, TT 29-30. The ECJ has shown a similar
reluctance to allow private schemes to justify discrimination by linkage to public
norms under article 7(1)(a) of the Social Security Directive. See Thomas, 1993 ECR at
1275, T 20 (permitting linkage only where scheme is "objectively and necessarily
linked" to retirement-age). As with the Article 2(3) cases cited in the following notes,
private actors are thus held to a higher standard of equality.
286. Case 342/93, Gillespie v. Northern Health and Soc. Svc. Bd., 1996 ECR 484,
499, 17. The Court did impose a sort of minimum adequacy requirement tied to the
Member States system of social protection. See id. at 500, 20-21.
287. Id. at 501, 22. The shift in the Court's rhetoric is striking. In the first in-
stance, it noted that "women taking maternity leave ... are in a special position ....
not comparable with that of [their colleagues] actually at work," whereas in the sec-
ond it held that "a woman who is still linked to her employer by. . . an employment
relationship during maternity leave must, like any other worker, benefit from any pay
rise" just as she "had she not been pregnant."
288. Case 136/95, Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse des Traivailleurs Sala-
ries v. Thibault, 1998 ECR 2011, 29-31 (holding that "a woman who continues to
be bound to her employer by her contract of employment during maternity leave
[could] not be deprived" of an annual performance review that could qualify her for
promotion).
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work.28 9 Reviewing the justifications offered by the employers in
question, the Court shot them down one by one:
[N]either the justification . . . that there is an established
practice . . . of only 'crediting' only actual service, nor that
stating that this practice establishes a reward system which
maintains a reward system which maintains staff motiva-
tion, commitment and morale, is relevant. The first justifi-
cation is no more than a general assertion unsupported by
objective criteria. With regard to the second, the system of
remuneration for employees working on a full-time basis
cannot be influenced by the job-sharing scheme. 290
The Court then established through analysis of the applicable rules
that granting the requested relief would not constitute discrimina-
tion in favor of female workers, and ruled out justification on eco-
nomic grounds because "an employer cannot justify discrimination
... solely on the ground that avoidance of such discrimination would
involve increased costs. 2 9 1
Nor did the Court stop there. It also noted that 83% of job-shar-
ers had chosen that option:
in order to be able to combine work and family responsibili-
ties, which invariably involve caring for children. Commu-
nity policy in this area is to encourage and, if possible, adapt
working conditions to family responsibilities. Protection of
women within family life and in the course of their profes-
sional activities is . . . the natural corollary of the equality
between and women [and a basic principle] recognised by
Community law.2 92
The exacting review the ECJ applied in Hill was a far cry from
its early indirect cases. Not only did the Court pierce generalizations
and independently assess the evidence, its dismissal of economic jus-
tifications and avowed purpose of "adapt[ing] working conditions" to
family life reveal the potential for indirect discrimination scrutiny to
become a powerful agent of social change.
As with the ECJ's direct cases, the Court's scrutiny of disparate
impact in employment has clearly grown increasingly exacting over
time, driven notably by rulings of the Court's Sixth Chamber.2 93 Yet,
289. Case 243/95, Hill and Stapleton v. Revenue Comm'r, 1998 ECR 3739, 3769,
30-33. As might be expected, women comprised over 98% ofjob sharers. Id. at 3767,
25.
290. Id. at 38.
291. Id. at 91 39-40.
292. Id. at IT 41-42; See also Case 1195, Gerster v. Freiestaat Bayern, 1997 ECR
5253, 38 (mandated "strict proportionality" review in private employment case).
293. The Sixth Chamber accounted for the move to strictness in Nimz and Rinner-
Kuhn, as well as the later assertiveness seen in Kriiger and Hill, notwithstanding an
almost total change of membership on the panel over this period. As noted, Botel
might also be seen as an attempt by the Sixth Chamber to resist the more relaxed
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with respect to social policy, the ECJ has moved in the opposite direc-
tion, resurrecting a margin of discretion long since abandoned, for all
intents and purposes, in the direct equal treatment cases. Two fac-
tors may account for this difference. As noted at the outset, the po-
tential reach of indirect scrutiny is much broader. Such scrutiny is
also likely to be more controversial. Whereas direct discrimination
cases often place the alleged offender in the morally difficult position
of having to justify outmoded gender distinctions, indirect discrimi-
nation is often easier to defend. 294 When the long-arm of the Court's
indirect review places in jeopardy long-standing social institutions,
such as the German staff councils in Bbtel, Member States are liable
to protest vehemently, raising politically resonant, albeit legally non-
availing appeals to subsidiarity.295 Allowing a margin of discretion
in social policy thus protects the Court from being forced to pass judg-
ment on policy questions that the Member States regard as outside
the Community's concern. 296
Fear of Member State backlash doubtless also figures in the
ECJ's practice of deferring to national courts in indirect gender cases
to a greater extent than it does in either its direct gender cases or its
indirect free movement rulings. 297 The Court has departed from this
practice only in the Nolte line of cases whose weakened standard
posed less of a threat. When the Court's scrutiny did bite in the staff
council cases, it was careful to defer the critical decision in the judg-
ments after Botel, accepting Germany's claimed social policy at face
value while outsourcing the proportionality review. It is probably
also no coincidence that the Court preferred to recast the question as
one of proportionality-relying on the scrutiny of means to avoid a
showdown over purpose, just as it did with the Article 2(2) cases.
scrutiny of the Nolte line of cases. See supra n. 274 and text. On this view, Kowalska
(also a Sixth Chamber ruling) stands as something of an anomaly.
294. Stereotypes about part-time workers go over better in public opinion than ste-
reotypes about women, even if in practice they may amount to the same thing. More-
over, while direct discrimination can almost be presumed intentional, disparate
impacts in indirect cases are not necessarily the product of gender bias and have quite
benign explanations.
295. Cf. AG Leger Opinion, Nolte, 1995 ECR at 4642, 69 (addressing subsidiarity
objection raised by Germany); Prechal, supra n. 270, at 93 n.52 (noting that German
Chancelor accused ECJ of "going beyond its competences" in Botel).
296. For much the same reason, the US Supreme Court has excluded indirect scru-
tiny entirely from constitutional Equal Protection review, while permitting actions for
disparate impact under statutory Title VII employment law. Compare Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
297. See Watson, "Equality of Treatment: A Variable Concept?," at 24 Indus. L.J.
33, 40-47 (1995) (contrasting more deferential approach in indirect gender cases with
that of free movement case law).
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IV. THE BIG PICTURE
In order to bring into sharper relief some of the common themes
that preceding sections have touched upon, it may be helpful to step
back from the minutia of case law to consider the collective body of
ECJ gender decisions as a whole. The characteristics of this jurispru-
dence will be explored from three perspectives: methodological, theo-
retical, and chronological.
A. Modus Operandi
Running throughout the European Court of Justice's gender case
law is a delicate balance between enforcement of equality and respect
for Member State discretion. To reconcile these often conflicting
aims, the Court follows a multidimensional practice of variable re-
view, tailoring the focus and intensity of its scrutiny to fit the charac-
teristics of the provision under appraisal, according to established
patterns. Each method of scrutiny has its benefits and drawbacks.
For example, purpose scrutiny makes for cleaner dividing lines, al-
though it requires a vision as to what the acceptable purposes may
be. When, as inevitable, this vision clashes with that of other policy
actors, it can also place a court in an unduly confrontational stance.
Means scrutiny provides a softer, more finely-tuned instrument, but
requires a court to second-guess questions of instrumental policy that
may go beyond its institutional competence. Deferring to a national
court takes the heat of the ECJ and offers greater factual sensitivity,
but risks losing the forest in the trees and encourages conflicting
results.
Similar tradeoffs enter the decision as to the level of scrutiny to
be applied. More intense scrutiny means a greater likelihood of judi-
cial intervention. This may reflect a presumption that gender dis-
tinctions in a given area are inappropriate, and/or that such policy
choices are better regulated under European law than national.
Looser scrutiny generally implies the opposite.
As the preceding discussion indicates, choosing between these
options implicates a complex mixture of principled and prudential
motives that vary according to the context. By adjusting its choice of
weapons and tactics accordingly, the Court maximizes the efficiency
of its review, while minimizing resistance from the Member States.
Thus, for Article 2(3), the Court has relied on a textually-anchored
notion of purpose that enables it to draw a clear dividing line, apply-
ing lenient review to measures that fall within Article 2(3)'s preg-
nancy/maternity core and strict review to those that do not. By
contrast, Article 2(2)'s more subjective and contextually-defined con-
tent makes purpose-scrutiny problematic. Instead, the Court of Jus-
tice has focused on ensuring an instrumental connection between
means and stated aim within a specific context. The margin of dis-
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cretion recognized in national security cases reflects both the Court's
limited competence to decide such questions and its desire to avoid
antagonizing Member States in a sensitive realm. With Article 2(4),
the amorphous nature of affirmative action resists both purposive
and instrumental controls. Instead, the Court has sought to ensure
that remedial measures minimize burdens on non-beneficiaries, by
favoring measures that target starting points over results and by re-
quiring flexibility. The ECJ's reluctance to engage in even minimal
necessity-scrutiny, however, suggests that the backlash from
Kalanke continues to haunt its judges.
Yet another approach is taken in the indirect discrimination
cases, where the ECJ has divided responsibilities according to insti-
tutional strengths, with the European Court concentrating on pur-
pose scrutiny and delegating to national courts to assess
proportionality. The distinction made between enforcement of public
norms, where the Court is careful to defer to Member States, and
private employment rules, where more stringent review applies,
doubtless reflects both the principled reasons outlined by Advocate
General Darmon, as well as the Court's self-protective instincts in the
face of controversies such as Botel. This basic public/private distinc-
tion is replicated in the affirmative obligation cases under Article
2(3).
Such tactical variations in methodology increases the likelihood
that conflicting results will obtain in cases involving overlapping
norms. This may sometimes lead to awkward discrepancies, as be-
tween the Articles 2(2) and 2(3) analysis in Johnston, or between the
Article 2(3) analysis in Commission v. France and Lommers' Article
2(4). Yet, such incongruities seem a small price to pay for more effi-
cient judicial review.
Variable scrutiny is not the only technique by which the ECJ
defuses Member State resistance. Whenever possible, the Court of
Justice bases its judgment on objective criteria; hence, its frequent
recourse to the principles of consistency, specificity, and trans-
parency. The ECJ also craves consensus. It is much more comforta-
ble taking a firm line when it knows that most Member States
support its position. Hence, its willingness to confront Germany in
Kreil where the Bundeswehr was out-of-line with its peers, but not to
take on the British marines in Sirdar.298 Moreover, the Court is
highly attuned to cues from the Community legislator, which, after
all, also reflect the views of the Member States. When the Council
shows willingness to exercise competence in an area, the Court will
be emboldened to forge ahead judicially as well, even to the extent of
298. See also Cases 122 & 125/99, D. v. E.U. Council, Judgment, May 31, 2001,
IT 49-50 (citing diversity of approaches to gay marriage in laws of Members States as
reason not to require equal treatment as a matter of Community law).
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preempting a Council directives, as it did in Gillespie.299 Conversely,
legislative silence may serve as a brake, as occurred in Grant, where
the Court took the failure of the Council to legislate against sexual
orientation discrimination as a signal to go-slow in that area. Such
accommodation has its limits, however. Legislative measures di-
rected against specific judgments of the Court have received a less
welcoming reception. Witness Abrahamsson's cursory treatment of
Article 141(4).300
B. Community vs. Autonomy
Notwithstanding these variations in methodological emphasis,
the effects of changes in the intensity of judicial scrutiny have tended
to conform to fairly predictable patterns. In general, the stricter the
scrutiny, the more it privileges individual autonomy at the expense of
communal standards. Just as free movement compels German con-
sumers to be exposed to foreign beers, so gender equality requires
that individuals be given the freedom to choose nontraditional lifes-
tyles, irrespective of gender. No longer tolerant of stereotypes and
generalizations, equal treatment demands that men be recognized as
parents potentially in need of leave (Comm. v. France); that women
can be police or soldiers (in re French Civil Serv., Kreil); and that
allowance be made for men with special needs, as well as women
(Marschall, Lommers). Similar patterns can be seen in indirect pay
discrimination cases, where the Court's review of discrimination
against part-time employees works to uncover bias against women
(Hill, Rinner-Kuhn).
Beyond the inherent value of individual autonomy, the ECJ has
justified such rulings, in part, based on the hidden costs of gender-
specific norms. Even well-intended measures providing special treat-
ment for women, it has argued, risk stigmatizing them as higher cost
employees (Rummler, Herz), or perpetuating stereotypes (Lommers,
Comm. v. France). Such claims have been criticized, however, by
feminist scholars who consider the benefits of special treatment to
outweigh the harm. They note that the Court of Justice has no power
to order "leveling up"; rather than expanding such benefits to allocate
them on a gender-neutral basis, Member States may withdraw them
299. Compare 1996 ECR at 500, J1 20-21, with Council Directive 93/85, Art. 11. A
similarly anticipatory ruling implemented by judicial fiat the equal value standard
that was to be the Equal Pay Directive's primary innovation.
300. Article 141(4) had been inserted at Amsterdam in response to Kalanke. See
Shaw, supra n. 8, at 104. A similar fate befell the "Barber Protocol," adopted in the
wake of Barber v. Guardian. See Arnull, supra n. 104, at 474-75.
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entirely.3 0 1 In this respect, gender equality differs from beer: There
may not be market providers to fill the void left by the state.
In any case, the linkage between strict review and individual au-
tonomy is hardly inevitable. Alternative methods of review could
lead to different consequences. Such contrapuntal themes occasion-
ally surface in EC case law. For example, instead of striving to elimi-
nate gender as a factor, a different approach would be to embrace it.
One see this in Rummler, where the Court sought to balance male
strength against other pay criteria that would play to female advan-
tage. Advocate General Slynn displayed a similar logic in the French
police case when he argued that, in some cases, the presence of wo-
men could deter violence as much as men. This approach would build
on the insights of "difference feminists" such as Carol Gilligan.
30 2
Yet another approach would apply the anti-subordination principle
espoused by feminist scholars such as Catherine MacKinnon and
Ruth Colker. 30 3 It is unclear what role such a rationale plays in ECJ
case law. The affirmative action cases after Kalanke might be seen
as moving in this direction, as might cases such as Hill-at least rhe-
torically-where the Court speaks of adapting working conditions to
home life.
C. A Chronological Perspective
Given the many different strands and complexities of ECJ gen-
der case law, it may be dangerous to attempt a portrait of its develop-
ment over time. The nature of the balance struck between strictness
and discretion varies case by case. Nonetheless, three main periods
can be tentatively identified. The first period spans the equal treat-
ment cases in the early 1980s, during which the Court exercised a
deferential review that declined to second-guess the policy decisions
of the Member States and, in Hofmann, explicitly recognized a mar-
gin of discretion. A second period begins with Johnston in 1986,
when the Court's scrutiny became more exacting. Gender-specific
norms were deemed derogations from equality and subjected to strict
review, and discrimination against part-timers was increasingly
scrutinized.
The shift to period three is harder to locate, and its characteris-
tics more complex. However, some time in the mid-1990s, the Court
began pulling back a little in several areas. One sees this most
clearly in indirect discrimination cases where a margin of discretion
301. See, e.g., Fredman, "The Poverty of Equality: Pension and the EC," 25 Indus.
L.J. 91, 96 (1996) (arguing that "leveling down" is the more likely outcome and citing
examples).
302. See generally Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982).
303. See Colker, "Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection"
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003 (1986); Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance
(1984).
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in social policy is revived. A similar margin is recognized in national
security cases under Article 2(2). The affirmative action cases after
Kalanke also reveal a more indulgent approach; the same applies (to
a lesser degree) to the German staff council cases after Botel.
Doubtless, no one set of factors accounts for this ratcheting
downward of ECJ scrutiny. In part, the Court may have been a vic-
tim of its own success. Having struck down the more obvious in-
stances of gender discrimination, it began to confront increasingly
controversial issues. In the early 1990s, decisions such as Kalanke,
Botel and Barber30 4 (a direct pay discrimination case) provoked angry
reactions from the Member States affected who accused the Court of
exceeding its competence. Kalanke and Barber prompted Treaty
Amendments to mitigate their impact, while German courts sought
reconsideration of Botel.30 5 A more circumspect approach by the
Court may thus be explained as a measure of self-protection. 30 6
One could also link this judicial retrenchment to broader trends.
The exclusion of the European Union's two new pillars from ECJ ju-
risdiction at Maastricht arguably bespoke a growing mistrust of the
Court among Member State governments. 30 7 The elevation of the
subsidiarity principle to constitutional status similarly reflected,
among other things, disquiet over ECJ activism. 30 8 The early 1990s
also brought signs of incipient rebellion by the constitutional courts
of several Member States. 30 9 The Court's new-found respect for
Member State discretion could be seen as a response to these shifts in
its constitutional landscape, and its relaxation of gender scrutiny
compared to the even more dramatic pull-back it effected for free
movement of goods in Keck during the same period. 310
Although it is premature to say, one could argue that this period
of retrenchment has now come to an end. Decisions such as
Abrahamsson, Lommers, Kreil, Hill and (in some respects) Seymour-
Smith may herald the return of a more robust approach to judicial
scrutiny, and the Amsterdam amendments' strong mandate for en-
forcement of gender equality may be seen as providing a green light
to supplant Maastricht's red. The level of scrutiny in gender cases
304. Case 262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assur. Group, 1990 ECR
1889. Barber extended Article 119's reach to private pension schemes.
305. See supra n. 300; Arnull, supra n. 104, at 473-74.
306. Cf. Shapiro, "The European Court of Justice," in Craig & de Bfirca, supra n.
45, at 336-39 (making similar argument re: free movement cases and Keck).
307. See id. at 339.
308. See Vause, "The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law-American
Federalism Compared," 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 61, 68 (1995).
309. The headliner among these was, of course, the German Constitutional Court's
notorious "Maastricht decision." 89 BverfGE 155 (judgment of Oct. 12, 1993); See also
Weiler, "Epilogue: The Judicial Apros Nice," in de Bdrca & Weiler, supra n. 8, at 220-
21 (citing case law from the Italian, Danish, Belgian and Spanish constitutional
courts).
310. Cases 267/91 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 1993 ECR 6097.
2003]
HeinOnline -- 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 607 2003
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
probably still falls short of that seen in free movement; however, the
Court has gone a long way toward erasing this historic inequality of
equalities and giving real meaning to the promise of fundamental
rights.
V. CONCLUSION
By analyzing the pattern of review in EC gender cases, we have
seen the European Court of Justice develop a sophisticated methodol-
ogy for judicial review that adapts the scrutiny applied according to
the nature of the provision under review. In doing so, the Court has
attempted to reconcile the conflicting demands of fundamental rights
and respect for Member State discretion.
Left unanswered by the present study is the extent to which this
variable approach represents a deliberate strategy of the Court. At
some level, it is clear that the ECJ does intentionally manipulate the
opposing concepts of "strictness and "discretion" (as well as "funda-
mental rights" and "social policy"). Cases such as Sirdar or Thibault,
where the Court feints one way and veers the other, exemplify this
sort of dialectical minuet. Yet, the lines drawn overall reflect a com-
plex of principled and prudential motives, some of which might have
structural origins beyond the Court's awareness or control. A degree
of path-determinancy may thus underlie what appear to be choices
made on a more or less ad hoc basis.
Unfortunately, without better insight into the decision-making
within the Court of Justice, this question may prove impossible to
resolve. The sparse reasoning and impersonal abstraction of the
ECJ's gender rulings shed little light on the question, and the advo-
cate general opinions are, by nature, an imperfect proxy. Doubtless
some part of this may be ascribed to difficulties inevitable to a mul-
tinational institution in which judges from very different legal tradi-
tions must agree on a single text. Yet, it sometimes seems as if
obfuscation is practiced as a deliberate tactic. Given the political sen-
sitivities within which the Court must operate, a degree of tact is
doubtless prudent. However, in the long run, well-reasoned judg-
ments remain essential for both the integrity of Community law and
the Court's own institutional credibility.
Such criticisms are hardly original. 311 Yet, they assume added
force in this context. If, as most commentators agree, the Court does
vary the rigor with which its proportionality test is applied according
311. See, e.g., Weiler, supra n. 309, at 219-21 (criticizing "outmoded" style of ECJ
decisions and noting existing of "a certain credibility issue" based on poorly reasoned
rulings emanating from Luxembourg); Bengoetxea, MacCormick, & Soriano, "Integra-
tion and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice," in de
Bdirca & Weiler, supra n. 8, at 46-47, 82-86 (underlining importance of rulings based
on principled justification).
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to the demands of particular cases, then it is essential for the Court
to articulate the factors that justify such choices, 312 lest its manipula-
tion of the standard of review become (or be seen as) a device to pre-
determine substantive outcomes. The European Court of Justice has
been far less responsive to this task than its US counterpart. The
principles underlying the European Court's variable approach may
be more intricate than those accounted for in the rigid tiers of US
equal protection, yet the burden of justification is no less great. This
paper has suggested that the Court's gender review has adhered to
consistent patterns that have responded in a nuanced manner to con-
flicting imperatives. The result has been a rich and, for the most
part, satisfying body of case law that constitutes a collective study in
judicial resourcefulness. The real wonder then about the Court's
under-reasoned opinions may be that they do not take more credit for
this achievement.
312. De Bidrca, supra n. 18, at 149-50.
2003]
HeinOnline -- 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 609 2003
610 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 51
HeinOnline -- 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 610 2003
